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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of consumer bankruptcy filings has hit yet another all-time
high. Since 1980, the number of bankruptcy filings in the United States has
increased by over 565% to a record number of 1,660,245 in 2003., Even
more amazing is the fact that consumer bankruptcy accounts for nearly 98%
1. See American Bankruptcy Institute, U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2003 (Business, Non-
Business, Total), http://www.abiworld.org/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfin?ContentID
=12324 (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
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of all bankruptcy filings. 2 In fact, one out of every seventy-two American
households filed for bankruptcy in the twelve-month period ending March
2004.'
With the growing prevalence of consumer bankruptcy, many consumers
are turning to debt adjustment under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code
("Code").4 Chapter 13 permits individuals with regular income to develop a
court-supervised plan that allows them to repay their debts over an extended
period of time.5 Under a Chapter 13 repayment plan, the debtor is required
to provide for repayment to both secured and non-secured creditors. 6 With
respect to secured creditors, the Code protects their interests in one of three
ways. First, the secured creditor can merely consent to the debtor's
proposed repayment plan.7 Second, the debtor can choose to surrender the
property that secured the claim.8 Finally, the debtor can force the secured
creditor to retain a lien on the property and accept payments that equal the
present value of the secured creditor's allowed claim.9 This final option is
commonly referred to as the "cram down" provision because it allows the
debtor to cram a repayment plan down on the creditor. '0
While the Code specifically provides for cram down, it fails to disclose
the proper method by which to calculate the interest rate that the debtor
should pay the secured creditor.1 This ambiguity has sparked a plethora of
litigation that eventually led to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Till v.
SCS Credit Corp. 12  While many anticipated a resolution of the issue, the
decision in Till resulted in a 4-1-4 split, with no majority opinion.1 3 Thus,
many questions still linger over Till and its application to Chapter 13.14
2. Id.
3. American Bankruptcy Institute, Households Per Filing, Rank During the 12-Month Period
Ending March 31, 2004, http://www.abiworld.org/statcharts/HouseRank.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2005).
4. In 2003, over 28% of those consumers who filed for bankruptcy chose reorganization under
Chapter 13. See Press Release, U.S. Bankr. Courts, Table F-2, Business and Nonbusiness
Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period
Ending December 31, 2003, http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/1203f2.xls (last visited Sept.
30, 2005).
5. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079.
6. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2000) (describing the contents of a bankruptcy plan). A
secured claim is defined as a "claim held by a creditor who has a lien or a right of setoff against the
debtor's property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 265 (8th ed. 2004). A creditor holds an unsecured
claim if there is no lien or right of setoffagainst property held by the debtor. Id.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (2000).
8. Il U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (2000).
9. It U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (2000).
10. See Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 956-57 (1997); see also infra notes
104-07 and accompanying text (explaining the cram down provision).
11. See II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000).
12. 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (plurality opinion).
13. Id.
14. See discussion infra Part VII.
Additionally, many commentators question Till's impact on Chapter 11,
which contains a similar cram down provision.' 5
This note will examine the Court's decision in Till v. SCS Credit Corp.
Part II will provide a brief historical background of federal bankruptcy
legislation. 16  Part III will examine the policy, evolution, and process of
Chapter 13 debt adjustment. 17 Part IV will discuss the cram down provision
and the various methods of computing the cram down rate. 8 Part V will
provide the facts and procedural history of Till.' 9 Part VI will analyze and
critique the plurality, dissenting, and concurring opinions of Till.20 Finally,
Part VII will discuss the legal impact of Till and what the case means for the
average consumer.2'
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
The genesis of federal bankruptcy legislation can be traced back to the
Constitution, which grants Congress the power to "establish... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies., 22 Under this power, Congress passed
a handful of formal bankruptcy acts, beginning in the nineteenth century
with the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,23 and followed by the Bankruptcy Acts of
184124 and 1867.25 While these acts attempted to establish permanent
federal bankruptcy legislation, each was repealed not long after its
enactment.26 The reason for this pattern of enactment and repeal may be
seen in the impetus that spurred each attempt at forming a uniform
bankruptcy system: financial panic.27 Each bankruptcy law lasted only as
long as the financial crisis that sparked its enactment.2 8 It was not until the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which remained in place for eighty years, that
permanency came to bankruptcy legislation.29
15. See discussion infra Part VII.C.
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra Part II1.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See discussion infra Part V.
20. See discussion infra Part VI.
21. See discussion infra Part VII.
22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
23. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. XIX, 2 Stat. 19, 19-36 (1800) (repealed 1803).
24. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. IX, 5 Stat. 440, 440-49 (1841) (repealed 1843).
25. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. CLXXVI, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (repealed 1878).
26. See supra notes 23-25.
27. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 24
(2001).
28. Id. at 24. For example, the 1800 Act came in the wake of a depression that started in 1793,
yet it was repealed three years later. Id. at 25. The "Panic of 1837" prompted Congress to pass the
Act of 1841, which lasted only two years. Id. Finally, the "Panic of 1857" paved the way for the
Act of 1867, which lasted for eleven years. Id.
29. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 23 (1995).
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Although the 1898 Act enjoyed a long tenure, it was amended several
times-most notably by the Chandler Act of 1938.30 Yet these amendments
were not enough to sustain the 1898 Act, and with a significant increase in
bankruptcy filings in the 1960s, the need for bankruptcy reform became
apparent.3 1 In response to this need, Congress created a Bankruptcy
Commission in 1970 whose purpose was to "study, analyze, evaluate, and
recommend changes to the [1898] Act... in order for such Act to reflect
and adequately meet the demands of present technical, financial, and
commercial activities., 32 Three years later, the Commission filed a report
33
that prompted Congress to pass the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 34
Commonly referred to as the "Code, 35 the 1978 Act has "brought the
full flowering of bankruptcy law in the United States., 36  Despite the
significant impact it had on establishing the current Bankruptcy Code, the
1978 Act has not survived unscathed and has been amended numerous times
by Congress. 37 Yet the 1978 Act has proven resilient, and it-along with
Congress's legislative adjustments-survives today as the Bankruptcy
Code.38
III. CHAPTER 13 DEBT ADJUSTMENT
A. The Advantages and Policy Behind Consumer Debt Adjustment
Bankruptcy
Today's Code allows for different types of bankruptcy proceedings
including commercial liquidation under Chapter 739 and commercial
reorganization under Chapter 11.40 Yet in recent years, consumer
bankruptcy has dominated federal bankruptcy proceedings, accounting for
30. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978); Tabb, supra note 29, at 23.
31. SKEEL,supra note 27, at 131-32.
32. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub L. No. 91-354, § l(b), 84 Stat. 468, 468 (1970).
33. COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, pts. I and 11 (1973).
34. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (current version
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000)).
35. Tabb, supra note 29, at 32 n.232.
36. SKEEL, supra note 27, at 131.
37. Tabb, supra note 29, at 37 n.266. Professor Tabb believes that bankruptcy legislation since
1978 has been influenced by six factors: (1) Supreme Court and lower court decisions, (2) credit
industry lobbying, (3) the farm crisis of the early 1980s, (4) the use of the bankruptcy court as a
forum for complex social issues, (5) the influence of special interests groups, and (6) the sharp
increase of bankruptcy cases since 1978. Id. at 37-38.
38. Tabb, supra note 29, at 33 n.232, 37 n.266.
39. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2000).
40. See generally II U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2000).
nearly 98% of all filings.4 With respect to consumers who have regular
income, two general options are available: straight liquidation under Chapter
742 or debt adjustment under Chapter 13. Chapter 7 liquidation offers
consumers a fresh start and a solution to their indebtedness by quickly
discharging their obligation to repay their nonexempt debts." Chapter 13,
however, does not provide for liquidation and instead calls for an approved
repayment plan that is more manageable than the consumer's prebankruptcy
payments.4 5 Initially, Chapter 7's liquidation feature may seem to be the
more appealing option. Yet Chapter 13 presents a few advantages for both
creditors and debtors that are lacking in Chapter 7.
First, creditors generally receive more money under a repayment plan
than in liquidation.4 6 Second, debtors are allowed to retain assets that may
have a low resale value but a high replacement cost.47 Third, the debtor's
credit rating is protected because creditors look more favorably on debtors
following a Chapter 13 repayment plan than on those liquidating under
Chapter 7.48 Finally, because the debtor retains the responsibility of
repayment, feelings of failure may be avoided and replaced with debtor
confidence.49
The overall purpose of Chapter 13 is to "enable an individual ... to
develop and perform under a plan for the repayment of his debts over an
extended period [of time]" and to enable "him to support himself and his
dependents while repaying his creditors at the same time., 50  Thus, the
underlying policy of Chapter 13 is to encourage the repayment of debt rather
than simply discharging a debtor's obligations."
B. The Evolution of Chapter 13 Debt Adjustment Bankruptcy
While the concept of debt adjustment was explored by Congress in the
early years of bankruptcy legislation,5 2 a permanent debt adjustment




42. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2000).
43. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2000).
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2000). A nonexempt debt is any debt not listed as exempt under 11
U.S.C. § 523 (2000).
45. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2000) (providing for adjustment of debts and setting
forth the requirements for a plan under Chapter 13).
46. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079.
47. Hon. Roger M. Whelan et al., Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Balancing the Equities in
Chapter 13,2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 165, 166 (1994); see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079.
48. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079.
49. Whelan et al., supra note 47, at 166; see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079.
50. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079.
51. See ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 10.1, at 1079 (5th ed. 2003).
52. See In re Scher, 12 B.R. 258, 261-62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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provision was not introduced until the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was amended
by the Chandler Act of 1938,53 which introduced a debt adjustment
provision as Chapter XIII.54  Chapter XIII was not perfect, however, and
often led to unmanageable debt loads causing individuals to opt for the clean
slate provided under liquidation proceedings.55 An observation of some of
its problems reveals why Chapter XIII was an unpopular choice among
debtors. First, creditors had the power to veto even the most generous of
plans.5 6  Second, Chapter XIII was available only to those who earned
wages and not to the self-employed. 57 Finally, Chapter XIII left the door
open for creditors to seek payment from persons who cosigned the debtor's
promissory notes.
58
In an effort to remedy these problems and make consumer repayment
plans more attractive, Congress revamped Chapter XIII with an intention to
allow the debtor the freedom to formulate a realistic and manageable plan
without the intervention or approval of creditors. 9 Today, we are left with
the current Chapter 13 which represents a "viable and popular alternative
that should be seriously considered by individuals seeking relief from severe
financial pressures., 6 °
C. The Process of Filing for Chapter 13
The Chapter 13 debt adjustment process can be broken down into four
basic steps. The first step is to file for relief under Chapter 13.61 When
relief is granted, an automatic stay protects debtors and co-debtors from debt
53. Whelan et al., supra note 47, at 166.
54. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978). Those who drafted the debt
adjustment provision chose to use Roman numerals to label their chapters. See id. The current
Code, however, lists its chapters with Arabic numerals. Thus, references to "Chapter XIII" in this
article refer to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended by the Chandler Act. References to "Chapter
13" refer to the current Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
55. Whelan et al., supra note 47, at 166.
56. See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §§ 651, 652(1), 52 Stat. 934 (repealed 1978); see also
RESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.1, at 1079-80. This requirement of creditor acceptance was seen as the
reason for the downfall of most Chapter XIII filings. See In re Scher, 12 B.R. at 265.
57. See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 606(3), 52 Stat. 930 (repealed 1978); RESNICK, supra
note 51, § 10.1, at 1080.
58. RESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.1, at 1080.
59. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 123 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6084.
60. RESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.1, at 1080.
61. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (2000). It is important to note that Chapter 13 filings are voluntary
and a debtor cannot be forced into an involuntary debt adjustment plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (2000).
The reason for insisting on voluntary filings under Chapter 13 is to avoid the possibility of
unconstitutional involuntary servitude. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 120-
21 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6080-82. The procedural requirements for filing a
Chapter 13 case are very similar to those requirements under Chapters 7 and II and are governed
under Chapter 3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 103(a), 301-66 (2000); RESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.5, at 1091.
139
collection and lien enforcement. 62  The second step is for the debtor to
formulate and file a plan for repayment.63 The third step takes the form of a
confirmation hearing held in court to determine whether the plan is
appropriate. 64 Finally, when the plan is confirmed by the court it becomes
binding on both the debtor and the creditor, and the debtor begins to make
payments pursuant to the plan.65
D. The Debt Adjustment Plan
At the core of Chapter 13 is the debt adjustment plan, which determines
how debtors will repay creditors.66 Unique to Chapter 13 is the right of the
debtor to make the sole determination of the contents of the proposed plan.67
Although the debtor maintains substantial control over the plan, the
Bankruptcy Code provides requirements and guidance for formulating a
plan. These guidelines are outlined in § 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code which
contains mandatory, prohibited, and optional provisions.68
1. Mandatory Provisions
The first mandatory provision that must be included in the plan calls for
the "submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other future
income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is
necessary for the execution of the plan., 69 This means that the debtor must
turn over to the trustee an amount of future earnings sufficient to satisfy the
repayment plan.7° Whatever money is left after this submission remains in
the debtor's hands for his or her personal support.7' While a Chapter 13
plan may be drafted so that the debtor can take advantage of making periodic
payments to certain creditors, it also allows a debtor to liquidate a portion of
his assets in order to satisfy other creditors.72 Thus, Chapter 13 allows the
debtor the flexibility of choosing a middle ground between repayment and
liquidation.
The second mandatory provision requires the debtor to "provide for the
full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority
62. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 1301 (2000). This automatic stay provides debtors with relief from the
pressures of creditors and lasts at least until the debt adjustment plan is confirmed and may continue
beyond confirmation. RESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.6, at 1092.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000). Once filed, a plan may be modified at any time prior to its
confirmation as long as it complies with the requirements of § 1322. 11. U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1324 (2000).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1327 (2000).
66. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325 (2000) (outlining the contents and confirmation of a
debt adjustment plan).
67. See RESNICK, supra note 51, §10.15, at 1115 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 123 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6084).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2000); see infra Part III.D.l-3.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (2000).
70. See id.
71. SeeRESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.16, at 1116.
72. I1 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8) (2000).
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under section 507" of the Code. 7  Section 507 includes such claims as
administrative expenses related to bankruptcy proceedings,74 alimony, 75 and
certain state and federal taxes.76 Although any creditor who has a § 507
priority claim has the right to full payment, the creditor may agree to have
that claim treated differently as a non-priority claim.77
The final mandatory provision requires that "if the plan classifies
claims, [it must] provide the same treatment for each claim within a
particular class."78  Each class as a whole, however, may be treated
differently as long as that treatment is fair. 7
2. Prohibited Provisions
While the Bankruptcy Code requires certain provisions to be included in
the plan, it expressly forbids two others. 80 First, "[t]he plan may not provide
for payments over a period that is longer than three years, unless the court,
for cause, approves a longer period."'" This longer period may not exceed
five years and, again, it must be approved by a court.82  Second, a plan
cannot modify the rights of holders of "a claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence. 83
3. Optional Provisions
Although Chapter 13 mandates that certain provisions be included in the
plan while at the same time prohibiting others, the debtor is allowed the
freedom to tailor the plan to meet specific needs.84 To facilitate this
flexibility, § 1322 of the Code lists nine optional provisions that a debtor
may include in the plan.85 This list, however, is not exclusive and a plan
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (2000).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2000).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (2000).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2000). Other § 507 priority claims that must be paid in full include
the following: certain wages or commissions; certain contributions to an employee benefit plan;
certain claims made by farmers or fisherman; certain deposits paid in connection with the sale, lease,
or rental of property or personal, family, or household services; and certain commitments to a federal
depository institution. See II U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(6), (9) (2000).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (2000).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) (2000).
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (2000); RESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.18, at 1123.
80. SeeRESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.16, at 1117-19.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000).
82. Id.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2000).
84. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1)-(9) (2000). For example, a plan may include a provision "for the
curing or waiving of any default." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (2000). Also, a plan may provide for the
concurrent payment of both secured and unsecured debts. II U.S.C. § 1322(b)(4) (2000).
may "include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with" the
Code. 16
E. Confirmation of the Plan
Once the debtor has drafted a repayment plan, a court is required to hold
a confirmation hearing where creditors have the opportunity to object to the
debt adjustment plan.17 If the plan is filed in good faith8 ' and meets certain
requirements,89 then the court must confirm the plan, making it binding on
the debtor and the creditors involved. 90
Along with these essentials, additional requirements must be met
depending on the nature of the creditor involved. A distinguishing factor
among creditors is whether they hold a secured or unsecured91 claim. 92
With respect to unsecured claims, a creditor is protected, because the "value
[of the claim], as of the effective date of the plan," must not be "less than the
amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were
liquidated under chapter 7.''93 This means that debtors are required to pay
unsecured creditors at least as much as they would receive under liquidation.
Under this approach, creditors are protected and debtors have the flexibility
to tailor a feasible plan that will increase their chances of success.9 4  If,
however, the unsecured creditor objects to the plan, the court is not required
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10) (2000).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1324 (2000). Even if there is no objection to the plan, the court may still have a
duty to ensure that the plan complies with the Code. RESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.28, at 1133 n.l
(citing In re Harris, 62 B.R. 931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Cash, 51 B.R. 927, 930 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1985) ("Neither by statute nor by rule is the bankruptcy judge directed to confirm a
chapter 13 plan simply because no party in interest objected to confirmation of the plan"); In re
Bowles, 48 B.R. 502, 505 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) ("[T]he Court is under an independent duty to
verify that the plan does in fact comply with the law irrespective of the lack of objection by creditors
or the Chapter 13 trustee.")).
88. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §
102(g), 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(7)). The 2005 Act and its additional
good-faith requirement became effective on October 17, 2005. See Jonathan D. Epstein, The Rush
To File Bankruptcy Rule Will Be Stricter Beginning Oct. 17, BUFF. NEWS, May 15, 2005, at B7.
89. These requirements include full compliance with the Bankruptcy Code, payment of certain
fees, and proposal of the plan in good faith and without engaging in illegal activity. 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(1)-(3) (2000). Perhaps the most important of these requirements is ensuring that "the debtor
will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan." 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(6) (2000). This includes factoring in the debtor's ability to support himself or herself as
well as any family members. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 124 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6085 ("The court will necessarily be required to consider the debtor's ability to meet his
primary obligation to support his dependents, because otherwise the plan is unlikely to succeed.").
90. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1327(a) (2000).
91. A secured claim is defined as a "claim held by a creditor who has a lien or a fight of setoff
against the debtor's property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 265 (8th ed. 2004). A creditor holds an
unsecured claim if there is no lien or right of setoff against property held by the debtor. Id.
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)-(5), (b)(l) (2000). The Code provides a broad definition of a
claim which can include any "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured .... 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2000).
94. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 123 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6084.
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to confirm the plan unless either (1) the plan calls for a distribution of
property to the creditor that is at least equal to the amount of the claim, or
(2) the plan requires that all of the debtor's disposable income 9 for the next
three years be used to make payments under the plan. 96
Regarding secured claims, 97  a debtor has three options when
formulating its debt adjustment plan.98 First, a debtor can try to get the
secured creditor to accept the plan. 99 Second, a debtor may hand over the
property, thereby releasing itself from the creditor's secured claim.' 00 The
debtor's third and final option is to keep the property over the objection of
the creditor and draft a plan that allows the creditor to retain the lien' ° ' on
the property while at the same time providing for deferred payments, the
present value of which
95. The term "disposable income" is defined in the Code and refers to the excess of income after
the debtor makes reasonable expenditures for (1) "the maintenance or support of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor, including charitable contributions ... in an amount not to exceed 15 percent
of the gross income of the debtor" and (2) payments "necessary for the continuation, preservation,
and operation" of a business. II U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000). The reasonableness of
expenses is a question of fact to be determined by the court while considering the specific context of
the individual debtor and his or her dependents. 2 KEITH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY §
165.1, at 165-1 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2002).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(I)(A)-(B) (2000). It is important to note that the Code uses the word
"may" and not "shall" when referring to whether the court should approve the plan. Id. This implies
that this aspect of confirmation is within the bankruptcy court's discretion and not mandatory. See
RESNICK, supra note 51, § 10.35, at 1148 n.3 (citing In re Otero, 48 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1985)); 2 LUNDIN, supra note 95, § 163.1, at 163-3.
97. According to the Bankruptcy Code, the creditor's allowed secured claim is limited to the
value of the debtor's property that is securing the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest.., is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the
estate's interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value
of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
Id. For example, if a creditor owns a $10,000 claim that is secured by property worth $8,000, the
$8,000 portion will be treated as a secured claim and the $2,000 difference will treated as unsecured.
Id.
98. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 468 (2004) (plurality opinion).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (2000). Although creditors generally will only accept a plan that
protects their interests, the burden of legal action may influence creditors to accept a less-than-ideal
plan. Hon. John K. Pearson et. al., Ending the Judicial Snipe Hunt: The Search for the Cramdown
Interest Rate, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 35, 49 (1996) ("[L]enders try to avoid legal action since
it consumes their own resources as well as the debtor's, which may further damage the lender's
claim.").
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (2000); In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541
U.S. 465 (2004) ("If the creditor receives the collateral, then its rights under state law are vindicated
and its contract with the debtor is fulfilled .... ). If the property is worth less than the amount of
the claim "[t]he creditor may still seek the unsecured portion of its claim in bankruptcy, but it
proceeds as an unsecured creditor and without the preference the Code gives to secured creditors."
Id.
101. The reason for allowing the creditor to retain a lien "is to protect the holder.., from loss
occasioned by a failure on the part of the debtor to complete the proposed plan." 8 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1325.06[3][a], at 1325-28 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2005).
143
"is not less than the allowed amount of such claim."' 10 2 This third option is
commonly referred to as the "cram down" provision. 103
IV. THE CRAM DOWN PROVISION
Although the words "cram down" do not appear in § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii),
this provision allows a court to approve a plan that allows the debtor to keep
the property that secures the creditor's claim and force the creditor to accept
a modification of its rights.1 °4 For example, in Till v. SCS Credit Corp.,'
0 5
the Tills came up with a plan which allowed them to keep their truck and
which forced SCS to accept a repayment plan with a lesser interest rate than
under the original terms of the loan. 10 6 Thus, the Tills were able to cram
down a new repayment plan over the objection of SCS. In this way, the
cram down provision makes debt adjustment a more feasible option for the
consumer debtor because it prevents the objection of a single creditor from
halting the confirmation of the repayment plan. 1
07
The structure of each cram down case can be divided into two basic
steps. First, the value of the collateral0 8 securing the creditor's claim must
be determined.' 09 Second, the proper interest rate on the deferred payments
must be calculated in a manner that protects the present value of the secured
creditor's claim. "10
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000); Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 956
n.1 (1997). The text of§ 1325(a)(5) reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if-
... (5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim;
and (ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under
the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder...
II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (2000).
103. Rash, 520 U.S. at 956-57; Till, 541 U.S. at 468-69 (plurality opinion).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2000); David G. Epstein, Don't Go and Do Something Rash About
Cram Down Interest Rates, 49 ALA. L. REV. 435, 437 (1998). There is one important exception to
the cram down power. If the property securing the creditor's claim is real property and is the
debtor's principal residence, then a debt adjustment plan cannot modify the rights of the creditor. 11
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). The cram down power may be used in all other cases where a secured claim is
involved. Id.
105. 541 U.S. 465, 469-73 (2004) (plurality opinion).
106. Id.
107. Jacob D. Krawitz, Comment, Till v. SCS Credit Corp. (In re Till): A Rash Conclusion?, 23
ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 889, 894 (2004).
108. The term "collateral" refers to the "[p]roperty that is pledged as security against a debt; the
property subject to a security interest." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (8th ed. 2004)
109. Todd J. Zywicki, Cramdown and the Code: Calculating Cramdown Interest Rates Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 243 (1994).
110. Id.
[Vol. 33: 133, 2005] Can You "Till" Me How to Cram This Down?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
A. Determining the Value of the Collateral
In Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash,"' the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of how to value collateral involved in a Chapter 13 cram
down proceeding." 2 In that case, the Court was faced with the question of
whether the value should be determined (1) by the amount of proceeds the
creditor could get through a foreclosure sale, or (2) by the cost of
comparable replacement property. "3
In Rash, the debtor, Elray Rash, purchased a tractor truck using a loan
later assigned to Associates Commercial Association ("Associates"), a
creditor who also held a lien on Mr. Rash's truck." 4  Three years after
purchasing the truck, Mr. Rash and his wife filed a joint petition for Chapter
13 relief.'1 5 The Rashs' repayment plan invoked the cram down provision
of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) and provided for payments equaling the value of the
net foreclosure proceeds. 116 Associates objected and claimed that the proper
amount of payments should equal the cost of a replacement vehicle. "
7
In an eight-to-one decision, the Court agreed with Associates and held
that "the value of property retained because the debtor has exercised the...
'cram down' option is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like
asset." ' 8 Thus under the Court's holding in Rash, it is the replacement
value of property-not the foreclosure value-that serves as the basis for
calculating interest rates under the cram down provision.' 9  Although the
Court was able to come to this conclusion, it left "to bankruptcy courts, as
triers of fact, identification of the best way of ascertaining replacement value
on the basis of the evidence presented."
20
111. 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
112. See id.
113. See id. at 955.
114. Id. at 956. The purchase price of the truck at the time of sale was $73,700. Id.
115. Id. at 957.
116. Id. at 957. The Rashes had an expert value the net foreclosure proceeds at $31,875. Id. This
number represented the amount of money that Associates would have realized if it had repossessed
and sold the Rashes' truck. Id.
117. Id. Associates' own expert valued this amount at $41,000. Id.
118. Id. at 965.
119. Id. It is important to note that the Rash case deals only with the correct valuation of the
collateral at the effective date of the plan and not the method for valuing the deferred payments, i.e.,
the cram down interest rate which is the focus of the Till case. See Epstein, supra note 104, at 460.
120. Rash, 520 U.S. at 956 n.6 ("Whether replacement value is the equivalent of retail value,
wholesale value, or some other value will depend on the type of debtor and the nature of the
property."). Interestingly, the holding in Rash has since been codified by Congress in the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. See Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 327, 119 Stat. 23 (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2)). Following Rash, the 2005 Act sets the value of collateral at the
replacement value at the time of filing for Chapter 13 relief. Id. In addition, the 2005 Act mandates
that the replacement value for property acquired for personal, family, or household purposes be
determined by the price that a retail merchant would charge for such property. Id.
B. Computing the Cram Down Interest Rate
1. The Concept of Present Value
Once the value of the collateral is determined, the next step is to
determine the proper method for computing the cram down interest rate.
The cram down provision of Chapter 13 calls for the bankruptcy court to
examine "the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of [the] property to
be distributed under the plan. 121 Essentially, this means that the court must
determine the present value of the payments to be made under the plan.
122
The term "present value" refers to the time value of money, 123 a concept
Congress specifically intended to be examined under debt adjustment
plans. 124 The gist of this concept is that money in hand today is worth more
than the same amount of money paid in the future. '25
In the context of the cram down provision, the present value
requirement was designed to place the creditor in the same economic
position as if the collateral was liquidated and the creditor had the benefit of
the proceeds. 126 To accomplish this goal, a rate of interest must be applied
to the payments called for under the proposed plan. 2 7 Thus, "[t]he court
must arrive at an appropriate discount factor so as to fairly discount value
proposed to be given in the future on account of the allowed secured
claim." 128
2. Methods for Computing the Cram Down Interest Rate
Although the Code impliedly calls for the application of an appropriate
discount or interest rate, 129 it does not state what method of calculation
should be used. 3 0 Federal courts of appeal that have addressed this issue
121. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000).
122. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.06[l][a], at 1129-160 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th
ed. rev. 2005).
123. Id.
124. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 413 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6369.
125. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122, 1 1129.06[1][a], at 1129-160. The basic
formula for computing present value is PV = P/(I+I)N, where P equals the future amount, I is the
interest rate, and N is the number of periods. Id. at n.4. For example, to find the present value of
$1,000 payable in three years at an interest rate of 10%, you would divide $ 1,000 by 1.1 raised to the
third power (or 1.331). Id. This would leave you with a present value of $751.31.
126. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, 1325.06[3][b][iii][B], at 1325-34 ("Through
the payment of interest, the creditor is compensated for the delay in receiving the amount of the
allowed secured claim, which would be received in full immediately upon confirmation if the
collateral were liquidated.").
127. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 124 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6085 ("The
bill requires the court to value the secured creditor's interest.").
128. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 101, 1325.06[3][b][iii][B], at 1325-34.
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000).
130. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 473 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("The Bankruptcy
Code provides little guidance as to which of the rates of interest... Congress had in mind when it
adopted the cram down provision.").
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seem to agree that "the rate should compensate the creditor for its delay in
receiving the value of the collateral." 13' Most courts also agree that a
"market rate" should be used to compute cram down interest rates. 132 In
theory, a market rate consists of "a composite of rates determined in arms
length negotiations between buyers and sellers of funds in money
markets."' 3 1  Yet, in spite of this harmony, courts have not been able to
agree on a market rate method and "have developed divergent formulae for
calculating the interest rate."'31 4  Indeed, "[t]he market rate requirement,
judicially imposed upon present value analysis required by the Code, is so
elastic that it provides no guidance to the courts."'
3 5
Despite this confusion, courts have considered various methods for
computing the cram down rate and have developed four leading approaches:
(1) the coerced loan rate, (2) the cost of funds rate, (3) the presumptive
contract rate, and (4) the formula rate. ' 3 6
a. The Coerced Loan Approach
Under the coerced loan method, "[c]ourts... conceptualize the cram
down provision as forcing creditors to extend a new line of credit to the
debtor." 13 7 This approach allows a creditor to get a rate of interest equal to
what it could have received had it foreclosed and used the proceeds to make
new loans similar in duration and risk. 3 8 Following this logic, courts must
find an interest rate that places the creditor "in an economic position
equivalent to the one it would have occupied had it received the allowed
secured amount immediately, thus terminating the relationship between the
creditor and the debtor."'
3 9
131. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (citing Koopmans v.
Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am. ACA, 102 F.3d 874, 874 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d
211, 214 (5th Cir. 1997); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 59-
60 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953
(1997); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1993); United Carolina
Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1129-30 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 696-97 (9th Cir.
1990); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925,
928-29 (6th Cir. 1989)).
132. See Pearson et al., supra note 99, at 40-41.
133. Thomas 0. Depperschmidt, Choosing the Proper Interest Rate in Bankruptcy Proceedings:
Resolution of Special Issues in the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, 18 N. KY. L. REV. 457, 471
(1991). In other words, the market rate is the "going rate" of interest. Id.
134. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 589.
135. Pearson et al., supra note 99, at 43 (citing In re River Village Assocs., 161 B.R. 127 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1993)); Waltraud S. Scott, Comment, Deferred Cash Payments to Secured Creditors in
Cram Down of Chapter 11 Plans: A Matter of Interest, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1041 (1988)).
136. See infra Part IV.B.2.a-d.
137. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 591.
138. Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., 102 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1996).
139. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1993).
While the coerced loan method may appear attractive, it is not without
its faults. Critics of the coerced loan approach argue that it is too subjective
and causes courts to rely on their intuition rather than on objective
principles. 140 This is because there is no market for these types of coerced
loans that courts can look to when setting a cram down rate. 141 As one judge
has stated, "it is difficult to arrive at a current market rate of interest for a
hypothetical new loan when there is no market for the loan proposed, no
equity in the property and limited opportunity on the part of the debtor to
obtain financing outside of the Bankruptcy Code framework." 142
Because bankruptcy courts lack a reference point upon which to base a
cram down rate, they must instead turn to the testimony of expert
witnesses. 143  Experts, however, do little to provide the court with the
information necessary to make an objective decision because they must
resort to formulating "a rate that a hypothetical lender would charge to a
hypothetical debtor with the same characteristics for the coerced loan in
question."' 44 Relying on expert testimony presents another problem in that
the experts for the creditor will generally testify that no lender would loan
funds as called for under the debt adjustment plan. 145 This undermines the
cram down provision because it gives the creditor the power to veto any
proposed plan. 146
Additionally, the coerced loan method may improperly include a profit
element into the cram down rate. 147 Critics assert that the inclusion of profit
is improper because the purpose of the cram down provision is "to put the
creditor in the same economic position that it would have been in had it
received the value of its allowed claim immediately. The purpose is not to
140. Monica Hartman, Comment, Selecting the Correct Cramdown Interest Rate in Chapter 11
and Chapter 13 Bankruptcies, 47 UCLA L. REV. 521, 536 (1999); Pearson et al., supra note 99, at
45 (citing Zywicki, supra note 109, at 257-58).
141. Pearson et al., supra note 99, at 47.
142. In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 189 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991).
143. Pearson et al., supra note 99, at 47.
144. Id. at 48 (citing Jack Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter 1l Cram
Down, 14 CARDoZO L. REv. 1495, 1519 (1993)).
145. Pearson et al., supra note 99, at 48.
146. Id.; see also In re River Village Assocs., 161 B.R. 127, 138 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993), afid,
181 B.R. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
[T]he secured creditor could.., present expert testimony that no lender would make a
loan which is comparable to the treatment of the creditor under the terms of the plan. The
expert would then propose some high interest rate that a lender would require if it were to
make such a loan. It is likely that the proposed rates, representing a loan which the lender
would not be prepared to make, would be high enough to render the debtor's plan
infeasible. If the court accepted this expert testimony, the court could not cram down the
proposed plan. This turn of events would significantly reduce the debtor's chances of
reorganizing, and unfairly increase the secured creditor's bargaining power during the
plan negotiation process.
Id. (citing In re Oaks Partners Ltd., 135 BR. 440, 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991)).
147. Matthew Y. Harris, Comment, Chapter 13 Cram Down Interest Rates: Another Day, Another
Dollar-A Cry For Help in Ending the Quest for the Appropriate Rate, 67 Miss. L.J. 567, 574
(1997).
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put the creditor in the same position that it would have been in had it
arranged a 'new' loan."'
148
b. The Cost of Funds Approach
The cost of funds method sets the cram down interest rate at the "rate
the creditor would have to pay to borrow the amount equal to the collateral's
value." 49 Therefore, the focus shifts onto the creditor to determine what
interest rate it must pay when borrowing money. 50 The cost of funds rate
does not include transaction costs nor does it provide for a profit to the
creditor.' 5' Thus, "[t]he creditor is entitled only to the time value of its
money, not what it could receive in a hypothetical new loan to the
debtor." 1
5 2
Among the drawbacks to the cost of funds method is that it can be
difficult to apply in actual practice. 153 "Because individual creditors borrow
funds at different rates, bankruptcy courts would have to conduct evidentiary
hearings to determine a creditor's cost of funds on a case-by-case basis."'
' 54
Also, the cost of funds method could cause bankruptcy courts to treat
debtors unequally because the cram down rate would depend on the rates
each creditor is charged to borrow money.'
Another shortfall of the cost of funds approach, critics argue, is that
creditors do not receive adequate compensation. 5 6 Although this method
partially compensates creditors for a lost opportunity, it does not take into
account the costs of deferring payment and extending the lending period past
the time agreed in the original contract. 57 Also, the cost of funds method
does not compensate the creditor for transactional costs associated with cram
down. 1
58
148. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1997),
abrogated on other grounds by Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997) (citing In re
Dingley, 189 B.R. 264, 269 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995)).
149. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
150. Zywicki, supra note 109, at 253.
151. Id. at 255.
152. Id. at 254.
153. Valenti, 105 F.3d at 64.
154. Id. (citing In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Dingley, 189 B.R. 264,
271 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995)).
155. Id. at 64.
156. Zywicki, supra note 109, at 259.
157. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1993).
158. Zywicki, supra note 109, at 260. While one can argue that the creditor avoids transaction
costs by not having to make a new loan, "there is no evidence that there is any material decrease in
administrative and default costs when a secured loan becomes a cramdown loan." Id.
Yet another flaw in the cost of funds approach is that it improperly
assumes that creditors have an unlimited supply of capital. 59 Since "every
secured creditor has a limited amount of credit on which to draw,... it
follows that utilizing some of that borrowing capacity without providing the
secured creditor with the usual return on its capital produces a loss for the
secured creditor." 1
60
In addition, the cost of funds approach may give the debtor a
windfall. 161 Many creditors are commercial banks, and because of this they
are able to borrow money more cheaply than an ordinary debtor. 162  This
places the debtor in an advantageous situation relative to other similarly
situated debtors not in bankruptcy because the "cost of funds rate will permit
the debtor to use cram down to decrease the interest rate it is paying on its
loan."' 163 Thus, the cost of funds approach may actually provide the debtor
with an incentive to file for bankruptcy. '64
c. The Presumptive Contract Rate Approach
Another way to determine the cram down rate is the presumptive
contract rate approach. Under this method, the original contract rate that the
debtor agreed to in the original loan serves as the presumed interest rate. 165
Both the creditor and debtor are then allowed to rebut this presumption by
presenting evidence before the court to show that the cram down rate should
be either higher or lower than the original contract rate. 1
66
The presumptive contract approach is often tied into an application of
the coerced loan method. 167 The Third Circuit, for example, has used the
original contract as a starting point from which to calculate the coerced loan
rate. 168 Under this method, the coerced loan rate is set either higher or lower
than the contract rate, depending on the evidence presented. 169 The Fourth
Circuit, on the other hand, has applied the original contract rate as a cap on
setting the coerced loan rate. 170 This method, it argues, prevents the creditor
159. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (citing Michael E. S.
Frankel, The Emerging Fixed Cramdown Rate Regime: A Market-Driven Argument for Effective
Fixed Rates in Bankruptcy Cramdown, 2 U. CI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 643, 647 (1995)). "The cost
of funds method presupposes that a creditor will opt to exhaust some of its own credit in order to
replace the liquid capital it would have received after foreclosure and sale." Id.
160. United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1993).
161. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 590.
162. Zywicki, supra note 109, at 253.
163. Id.
164. Hartman, supra note 140, at 541.
165. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1993).
166. Id.
167. See id. at 70; United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1993).
168. Jones, 999 F.2d at 70-71.
169. Id. For example, a creditor could present evidence before the court to show that its current
rate is higher than the original contract rate because of fluctuating interest rates in the market. Id.
On the other hand, the debtor could also present evidence to show that the creditor's current rate is
lower than the contract rate. Id.
170. Hall, 993 F.2dat 1131.
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from receiving a windfall by limiting the creditor's claim to the amount
provided for in the original agreement. 171
When tied into the coerced loan method, the presumptive contract rate
will naturally suffer from many of the same faults of that method, such as
the lack of a coerced loan market and the reliance on expert testimony. 172
Yet because the original contract rate serves as a presumption, it will
become the cram down rate if there is no evidence to show that it should be
increased or decreased. Thus, under the rationale of one court, the parties
will be bound to a rate which they previously agreed was "a fair return to the
secured creditor over an extended period of time." 173
d. The Formula Rate Approach
Yet another method for determining the cram down rate is the formula
rate approach, which "requires the court to adopt a risk-free market rate as a
base, and then add a risk premium corresponding to the court's
determination of the riskiness of the reorganization plan. ' 174  Courts
generally determine the base by referring to the United States Treasury rate
or some other prime rate. 175 The risk premium, which generally ranges from
one to three percent, 176 is determined on a case-by-case basis. 17 7 Because
the base rate is relatively easy to determine and the risk premium is small,
the formula approach can be "clear and predictable." 178
Although the formula rate may be a simple and predictable method, this
simplicity may limit the discretion of a bankruptcy court because it locks the
court into the risk-free rate with only a small adjustment for risk. 179 Critics
of the formula approach argue that the exercise of judicial discretion is
inherent in the Code's cram down provision.' 80 Thus, by restricting that
discretion, the formula rate does not conform to the spirit of the cram down
provision."' Another problem with the formula approach is that a risk
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 140-146 and accompanying text.
173. In re Einspahr, 30 B.R. 356, 356 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
174. Pearson et al., supra note 99, at 50.
175. Id.; see, e.g., Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2nd
Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997)
("[T]he market rate of interest under § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) should be fixed at the rate on a United
States Treasury instrument .... ").
176. See, e.g., In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 847 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (finding a risk premium
of 2.8% appropriate); In re DeMaggio, 175 B.R. 144, 152 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (finding a risk
premium of 1% sufficient); In re Fisher, 29 B.R. 542, 551-52 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (finding a risk
premium of 1% adequate).
177. Pearson et al., supra note 99, at 50-5 1.
178. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
179. Id. at 591.
180. Id.
181. ld. In the words of the Seventh Circuit:
premium of only one to three percent may be too small to compensate
creditors sufficiently.' 82 Additionally, the risk-free rate cannot be adjusted
to account for unusual circumstances within particular market segments such
as increases in interest rates within that market., 83
V. TILL V. SCS CREDIT CORP.
Needless to say, there has been considerable disagreement over the
proper interest rate method that should be applied to the Code's cram down
provisions. 184  In 2004, the Supreme Court sought to address this issue in
Till v. SCS Credit Corp. 185 Although it was able to render a judgment in the
case, the Court was unable to come to a majority decision. 186 So, despite its
recent ruling, the Court has failed to resolve definitively the debate over
which cram down method should be used. 187
A. Facts
The facts of Till are akin to the typical Chapter 13 cram down case. 188
Petitioners Lee and Amy Till purchased a used truck from Instant Auto
Finance on October 2, 1998.189 To pay for the truck, the Tills made a $300
down payment and financed the remaining balance of $6,425.75 by signing
There are a multitude of possible creditor/debtor relationships subject to the cramdown
provision. Each presents its own risks; to adopt a standard interest rate with limited
discretion vested in the bankruptcy court only to take into consideration the contingency
of nonpayment would not necessarily fulfill the statutory command that the creditor be
afforded the full value of his interest at the time the reorganization plan becomes
effective. The statutory provision necessarily leaves the particular questions of valuation
to the informed discretion of the bankruptcy court. Our adoption of a rigid formula would
unduly restrict that discretion. The statute contemplates a more particularized inquiry,
and we are bound by Congress' policy choice in this regard.
Id.
182. In re Busconi, 147 B.R. 54, 55 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (finding the formula rate to be
"patently unfair to secured claimants" and that creditors "should not be denied compensation for
profit and risk of nonpayment in a cramdown.").
183. In re Neff, 89 B.R. 672, 679 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988), amended in part on other grounds by
96 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
184. See Depperschmidt, supra note 133, at 457.
185. 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (plurality opinion).
186. Id. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality opinion, in
which Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined. Id. at 468. Justice Thomas
concurred only in the judgment of the plurality and wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 485-86. Justice
Scalia delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 492.
187. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). "When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds .. "' Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)); see
also Hon. James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1101, 1128
(2004) ("The lack of a majority opinion raises the question of whether Till is binding precedent.").
188. See Kristopher Aungst, The Supreme Court Till(s) for the Method to Compute Cramdown
Interest Rates, 2003 No. 8 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 3 ("Till is not factually unique.").
189. Till, 541 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 33: 133, 2005] Can You "Till" Me How to Cram This Down?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
an installment contract with Instant Auto. 190  Instant Auto immediately
assigned this contract to Respondent, SCS Credit Corporation ("SCS"), a
sub-prime lender who makes loans to individuals with poor credit histories,
such as the Tills.' 9' Per the terms of the contract, the Tills were required to
make sixty-eight biweekly payments and were charged an interest rate of
21% on the outstanding balance for the duration of the loan. 192 To protect
its interest, SCS retained the right to repossess the truck should the Tills ever
default on their repayment contract. 193
Unfortunately, the Tills did default on their payments to SCS and on
October 25, 1999, they filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. 194 On that
date, the Tills still owed SCS $4,894.89 even though the truck was only
worth $4,000.'9'
Under their repayment plan, the Tills were required to surrender their
future earnings to the bankruptcy court for a period of three years. 196
Additionally, $740 of their wages were to be assigned to the trustee each
month, who was then required to distribute this money among the Tills'
various creditors. 97 Regarding the truck and the secured portion of SCS's
claim, the Tills invoked the cram down provision of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) in a
plan that provided for interest to be paid at an annual rate of 9.5%. 198 SCS,
however, objected to this plan claiming that it was entitled to the original
contract rate of 21%-the rate it could get by selling the truck and
reinvesting the proceeds in a loan comparable to the original loan made to
the Tills. 99
190. Id. at 470.
191. Id.; In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
192. Till, 541 U.S. at 470 (plurality opinion).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. Both parties agreed that the truck had a fair market value of $4,000. Id.; Joint Appendix
at 16-17, Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (No. 02-1016). In its telling of the facts, the
appellate court stated the value of the truck at $4,500. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 585. The Joint
Appendix that was filed with the Supreme Court, however, lists the value at $4,000. Joint Appendix
at 16-17, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). Thus, according to § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
SCS had a secured claim of $4,000 and an unsecured claim of $894.89. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
(2000).
196. Till, 541 U.S. at 471 (plurality opinion).
197. Id.
198. Id. The Tills arrived at this rate using the formula rate method by adding a 1.5% risk
premium to the national prime rate of 8%. Id. In this case, the national prime rate of 8% was the
rate that banks applied to low-risk loans. Id.
199. Id.; Joint Appendix at 19-20, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016). SCS was the sole creditor to
object to the Tills' Chapter 13 debt adjustment plan. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 585.
B. Procedural History
In a hearing before a bankruptcy court, SCS presented testimony to
show that it normally charged a rate of 21% to customers with poor credit, a
rate that SCS claimed was typical in the sub-prime market. 00 Testifying on
behalf of the Tills, an economics professor opined that the proposed 9.5%
rate was adequate for two reasons: (1) it was financially feasible; and (2)
court supervision lowered the risk of nonpayment. 20 ' Finding in favor of the
Tills, the court overruled SCS's objection and confirmed the debt adjustment
plan and its 9.5% cram down rate.202
In an appeal to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana, SCS again asserted that it was entitled to the contract rate of
2 1%.203 Relying on its interpretation of Seventh Circuit precedent, which
adopted the coerced loan method, the district court held that SCS's proposed
rate of 21% was appropriate.20 4
Unhappy with this result, the Tills appealed to the Seventh Circuit.20 5
Finding that the district court had misread Seventh Circuit precedent, a
majority of the court applied the coerced loan method using the original
contract rate as a starting point from which to adjust the cram down rate.206
To be fair, the court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court so that the
parties could each have the chance to rebut the presumptive rate of 21%.207
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION IN TILL V. SCS CREDIT CORP.
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in June 2003,20 8 it seemed
that the debate over cram down rates would be laid to rest. Because the
Court was unable to reach a majority opinion in Till, however, the issue has
not been settled.20 9
Justice Stevens, writing a plurality opinion that garnered the support of
three other Justices, 210 adopted the formula rate approach to Chapter 13 cram
down cases.21 Justice Thomas, although concurring with the plurality's
judgment in the case, wrote a separate opinion adopting a risk-free approach
to cram down.212 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, wrote a dissenting
200. Till, 541 U.S. at 471 (plurality opinion).
201. Id. at 471-72. The professor presented his opinion to the court despite admitting that he was
unfamiliar with the sub-prime auto lending market. Id.
202. Id. at 472.
203. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 586.
204. Till, 541 U.S. at 472 (plurality opinion).
205. In re Till, 301 F.3d at 586.
206. Id. at 592.
207. Id. at 593.
208. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 539 U.S. 925 (2003).
209. Walker & Nickell, supra note 187, at 1126 (stating that the Court's recent decision in Till
"offers no resolution" on the cram down issue); see also infra Part VII.A.
210. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 468 (2004) (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens was
joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. Id.
211. See id. at 479-80.
212. Id. at 487.
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opinion that drew the support of three other Justices.2 13 In his opinion,
Justice Scalia argued that the presumptive contract method should be used in
Chapter 13 debt adjustment proceedings.21 4 The following section will
analyze and critique each opinion written by the Court in the Till case.
A. Justice Stevens's Plurality Opinion
After laying out the facts and procedural history of the case, Justice
Stevens begins his opinion by examining the cram down provision of
Chapter 13.215 Justice Stevens first recognizes that the Code "provides little
guidance" as to the appropriate method for computing cram down rates.21 6
He also acknowledges that bankruptcy courts must make a difficult choice
when faced with what method to apply. 2 7 According to Justice Stevens, a
court must address three important considerations when making that
decision.218
"First," Justice Stevens writes, "the Bankruptcy Code includes
numerous provisions that.., require a court to 'discoun[t] ... [a] stream of
deferred payments back to the[ir] present dollar value."' 21 9 Because the
same present value language appears in a number of provisions in the Code,
according to Justice Stevens it is likely the intention of Congress to have the
same interest rate method applied to all of the Code's provisions that require
a present value calculation. 220 Additionally, Justice Stevens points out how
"Congress would favor an approach that is familiar in the financial
community and that minimizes the need for expensive evidentiary
proceedings. 2 2'
Second, Justice Stevens confirms that under § 1322(b)(2) a court's
power to modify the original terms of a loan is "perfectly clear., 222 Justice
Stevens goes further by stating that this power may be exercised to "account
for intervening changes in circumstances.,
223
Justice Stevens's final consideration is that § 1325(a)(5)(B) mandates an
objective approach.224  He shuns a subjective approach and posits that §
213. Id. at 491. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Kennedy. Id.
214. Id. at 492.
215. See id. at473-77.
216. Id. at473.
217. Id. at 474.
218. Id. at 474.
219. Id. (quoting Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472 n.8 (1993)).
220. Id. at 474.
221. Id. at 474-75.
222. Id. at 475.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 476-77. To support this conclusion, Justice Stevens cites to Rash, 520 U.S. 953, a case
dealing with the proper valuation of collateral. See supra Part IV.A. In that case, Justice Stevens
1325(a)(5)(B) does not require cram down terms to match those provided in
the original contract.225 Therefore, "a court choosing a cram down interest
rate need not consider the creditor's individual circumstances ... [r]ather,
the court should aim to treat similarly situated creditors similarly. 226
1. Justice Stevens Rejects the Coerced Loan, Presumptive Contract
Rate, and Cost of Funds Approaches
After setting out these general considerations, Justice Stevens rejects the
coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches stating
that each "is complicated, imposes significant evidentiary costs, and aims to
make each individual creditor whole rather than to ensure the debtor's
payments have the required present value. 227
With respect to the coerced loan approach, Justice Stevens rejects this
method because it requires bankruptcy courts to delve into "an inquiry far
removed from such courts' usual task of evaluating debtors' financial
circumstances and the feasibility of their debt adjustment plans., 228
Additionally, he argues that transaction costs and overall profits are
improper components to be included in a cram down loan.229
Next, Justice Stevens lists four reasons for rejecting the presumptive
contract rate approach. First, it "improperly focuses on the creditor's
potential use of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale., 230 Second, while Justice
Stevens recognizes that the presumptive contract rate approach allows a
bankruptcy court to avoid overcompensation by tailoring the interest rate to
an individual creditor, he notes how this can be a burdensome for the debtor
by forcing it to present evidence to rebut the presumptive contract rate.3
Third, Justice Stevens asseverates that the presumptive contract rate
"produces absurd results" by allowing "'inefficient, poorly managed lenders'
with lower profit margins to obtain higher cramdown rates than 'well
managed, better capitalized lenders."' 232  Finally, a dependency on the
parties' prior dealings may cause "similarly situated creditors [to] end up
with vastly different cram down rates., 233
notes, the Court held that collateral should be valued from the debtor's perspective rather than the
creditor's perspective. Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.13 (plurality opinion). Stevens argues that the same
rationale should apply in this case. Id. at 476.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 476-77.
227. Id. at 477.
228. Id. As an example, Justice Stevens notes that the coerced loan approach requires a court to




232. Id. at 478 (quoting 2 KEITH M. LUNDtN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 112.1, 112-8 (3d ed.
2000)).
233. Id. at 478. To illustrate, Justice Stevens poses the following hypothetical:
[Sluppose a debtor purchases two identical used cars, buying the first at a low purchase
price from a lender who charges high interest, and buying the second at a much higher
purchase price from a lender who charges zero-percent or nominal interest.
156
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Justice Stevens also rejects the cost of funds approach because "it
mistakenly focuses on the creditworthiness of the creditor rather than the
debtor. 23 4  Additionally, Justice Stevens notes how this approach suffers
from some of the same flaws as the presumptive contract rate and coerced
loan methods. 35 To illustrate, he notes how the cost of funds approach
"imposes a significant evidentiary burden" on the debtor and also how it can
cause a situation where creditors are treated inequitably.
23 6
2. Justice Stevens Adopts the Formula Approach
After dispensing with the other forms of computing cram down rates,
Justice Stevens adopts the formula approach as the proper method to be used
in cram down proceedings.2 37  To set the risk-free basis, Justice Stevens
recommends looking to the national prime rate which estimates how much a
commercial bank would charge a creditworthy commercial borrower.238 In
order to adjust for the risk posed by the bankrupt debtor, factors such as "the
circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and
feasibility of the reorganization plan" should be taken into consideration at
the confirmation hearing.239 While recognizing that this requires the parties
to present evidence before the court, Justice Stevens mentions that some of
the evidence will be included in the prebankruptcy filings, thereby limiting
the expense of presenting new additional evidence.24 ° Justice Stevens goes
further, noting that since the risk-free rate is a low estimate that must be
adjusted upwards, the primary evidentiary burden will be placed on the
creditor, "who [is] likely to have readier access to any information absent
from the debtor's [prebankruptcy] filing.",
241
In summary, Justice Stevens notes how "the formula approach entails a
straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry, and minimizes the need for
potentially costly additional evidentiary proceedings. 242 He also points out
Prebankruptcy, these two loans might well produce identical income streams for the two
lenders. Postbankruptcy, however, the presumptive contract rate approach would entitle
the first lender to a considerably higher cram down interest rate, even though the two
secured debts are objectively indistinguishable.
Id. at 478 n.17.
234. Id. at 478.
235. Id.
236. Id. For example, in order for the debtor to rebut the creditor's coerced loan rate, it would
have to produce evidence regarding the creditor's financial status and at what rate the creditor would
lend money to similarly-situated debtors. See id.
237. See id. at 477-80.
238. Id. at 478-79. This rate, Justice Stevens notes, includes such factors as "opportunity costs of





how the formula approach takes the focus off the creditor and, instead,
places it on the financial markets, the bankruptcy estate, and the loan
itself. 243
While Justice Stevens advocates an upward adjustment of the risk-free
rate, he refuses to adopt a proper scale for such an adjustment, stating that
"the issue is not before us."244  Justice Stevens does, however, show
approval for the 1.5% rate adopted by the bankruptcy court in this case and
also cites to other courts that have applied rates of 1% to 3%.24' Also,
Justice Stevens refuses to resolve a dispute among the parties regarding the
failure rate of consumer debt adjustment plans, stating that "[i]t is sufficient
for our purposes to note that ... [the Code] obligates the court to select a
rate high enough to compensate the creditor for its risk but not so high as to
doom the plan., 24
6
3. Justice Stevens Criticizes the Dissent
The next part of Justice Stevens's opinion addresses the issues raised by
Justice Scalia's dissent.247 Justice Stevens points out that the dissent makes
two assumptions to support the presumptive contract rate approach, but it is
"highly unlikely that Congress would endorse either premise., 248 Regarding
the dissent's first assumption-that "subprime lending markets are
competitive and therefore largely efficient"--Justice Stevens simply states
that "there is no basis for concluding that Congress relied on this assumption
when it enacted Chapter 13.''249 Justice Stevens also notes how used
vehicles are sold in "tie-in" transactions where purchase prices are
negotiated in tandem with financing terms that are dictated by the seller.25 °
Thus, he argues, there is "no way of determining whether the allocation of
that price between goods and financing would be the same if the two
components were separately negotiated., 25' This is significant, Justice
Stevens notes, because the only issue before the Court is the cram down
interest rate and not the value of the truck which is fixed under Rash.252
Additionally, Justice Stevens posits that extensive state and federal
regulation of sub-prime lending distorts the market and shows how
243. Id.
244. Id. at 480.
245. Id. (citing Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2nd
Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Assocs. Commercial Corp., v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953
(1997)).
246. Id. at 480.
247. See id. at 481-85.
248. Id. at 481.
249. Id.
250. Id. For example, if the seller knows that he will be able to make money off of finance
charges, he may be willing to sell at a lower price. Conversely, if the buyer pays for the car in cash,
the seller may only sell at a price that will compensate for the missed opportunity to collect finance
charges.
251. Id. at 482 n.20.
252. Id. For an explanation of the Court's previous holding in Rash, see supra Part IV.A.
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regulators believe that sub-prime lenders, if left unregulated, "would exploit
borrowers' ignorance and charge rates above what a competitive market
would allow." '253
To rebut the dissent's second assumption-that the risk of default while
in Chapter 13 is usually no less than at the time of the original contract-
Justice Stevens argues that "Congress intended to create a program under
which plans that qualify for confirmation have a high probability of
success."25 4 While acknowledging that bankruptcy judges may confirm too
many risky plans, Justice Stevens suggests that the "solution is to confirm
fewer such plans, not to set default cram down rates at absurdly high levels,
thereby increasing the risk of default.,
255
Next, Justice Stevens briefly addresses the risk-free approach advocated
by Justice Thomas.256 Justice Stevens agrees with Justice Thomas that §
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) may have been written by Congress with no intention of
compensating for the risk of default. 257 The risk-free approach, however, is
ultimately rejected by Justice Stevens for two reasons. First, the Court's
decision in Rash assumed that cram down rates are adjusted to compensate
for risk of default.258 Second, because the risk-free approach has been
rejected by so many judges, it is "too late in the day to endorse that approach
now." 25 9  While Justice Stevens concludes that a risk factor should be
included in cram down rates, he notes how Justice Thomas's approach,
unlike the dissent's, is more consistent with the statutory scheme of
promoting successful reorganization plans.26°
Justice Stevens further criticizes the dissent, noting that its assumptions
may not support the presumptive contract rate approach.26' To support this
assertion, Justice Stevens explains that while the cram down provision
applies to sub-prime loans, it also applies to prime loans that were
negotiated before "the change in circumstance.. . that rendered the debtor
insolvent., 262 Also, cram down applies in situations where national or local
economies may have changed drastically since the time of the original loan
contract. 263 "In either case," Justice Stevens writes, "there is every reason to
think that a properly risk-adjusted prime rate will provide a better estimate
253. Till, 541 U.S. at 482 (plurality opinion).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 482-83.
256. Id. at 483. For a report and analysis of Justice Thomas's risk-free approach to cram down
see infra Part VI.C-D.





262. Id. at 483-84.
263. Id. at 484.
159
of the creditor's current costs and exposure than a contract rate set in
different times.
To conclude his opinion, Justice Stevens points out that if all relevant
information was available to the parties, both the formula and presumptive
contract rate approaches would produce the same cram down rate.265 Thus,
his primary disagreement with the dissent is upon which party the
evidentiary burden should fall.266 According to Justice Stevens, the creditor
should receive the majority of this burden because the creditor is "more
knowledgeable... thereby facilitating more accurate calculation of the
appropriate interest rate. 267
B. Critique of Justice Stevens's Plurality Opinion
Although four justices adopted the formula rate approach, Justice
Stevens failed to attract the requisite support of a majority of the Court.265
This may be for good reason, as there are significant shortcomings
associated with the application of the formula rate approach in cram down
proceedings.
269
1. The Formula Rate Limits Judicial Discretion
The first drawback to the formula rate approach is that it has the
potential to limit judicial discretion, which is an essential element in cram
down proceedings.27 ° Indeed, Justice Stevens himself recognized that a
bankruptcy court has the power to modify original loan terms and that such
authority is "perfectly clear." 271  The formula rate, however, may be too
inflexible because the prime rate starting point is determined by a source




267. Id. at 484-85.
268. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Stevens's opinion. Id. at 468 (plurality
opinion). Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring only in the judgment of the plurality.
Id. at 485 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia delivered a dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Thus, Justice Stevens's selection of the formula rate approach for computing cram down rates is
supported only by a plurality of the Court.
269. See infra Part VI.B.1-4.
270. Judicial discretion is important in the cram down context because each creditor/debtor
relationship presents its own unique characteristics. See In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 590-91 (7th Cir.
2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 465 (2004). In order to respond to each specific case, a bankruptcy court
must have the flexibility to adapt to the circumstances at hand. Id.
271. Till, 541 U.S. at 475 (plurality opinion).
272. See In re Till, 301 F.3d at 591. "The statutory provision necessarily leaves the particular
questions of valuation to the informed discretion of the bankruptcy court. Our adoption of a rigid
formula would unduly restrict that discretion. The statute contemplates a more particularized
inquiry, and we are bound by Congress' policy choice in this regard." Id.
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by the generally accepted prime rate-a percentage that is wholly outside the
discretion of the court.
273
While one may argue that the addition of the risk premium is enough to
satisfy the role ofjudicial discretion, it is important to note that this premium
is set at a small number.274 Indeed Justice Stevens recognizes this when he
notes that typical risk premiums range from 1% to 3%.275 Thus, with regard
to setting the appropriate cram down rate, judicial discretion is limited to a
maximum spread of only two percentage points.
In a similar vein, the formula rate's rigid approach presents another
issue-the need of the bankruptcy court to adjust to changes in
circumstances. Justice Stevens recognizes as much, stating that "the
potential need to modify the loan terms to account for intervening changes in
circumstances is... clear., 276  Yet a predetermined prime rate with a
minimal risk adjustment can hardly give a bankruptcy court the requisite
room to set a cram down rate that conforms to the particulars of a certain
case. 277
2. The Formula Rate May Undercompensate Secured Creditors
In addition to its inflexibility, the formula rate approach may result in
the undercompensation of secured creditors. In fact, Justice Stevens
acknowledges that the formula rate is a low estimate.2 78 Indeed his prime
rate is one at which commercial banks lend money to commercial
borrowers 279-a far cry from the ordinary consumer subjecting himself to
the liability and expense of a sub-prime loan. 280  To defend his position,
Justice Stevens notes how the prime rate can be adjusted upwards in order to
compensate for the increased risk that occurs in sub-prime lending.
28
'
However, one must still question whether the 1% to 3% risk adjustment
273. Justice Stevens recommends that a court look to an outside source in order to determine the
prime rate. Till, 541 U.S. at 478-79 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he [formula] approach begins by
looking to the national prime rate, reported daily in the press.").
274. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
275. Till, 541 U.S. at 480 (plurality opinion).
276. Id. at 475.
277. See In re Neff, 89 B.R. 672, 679 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988), amended in part on other grounds
by 96 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) ("The problem with [the formula rate] approach is that it
does not permit sufficient latitude for consideration of unusual factual circumstances present in
particular cases and is not specific for a particular market segment.").
278. Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion).
279. Id.
280. Generally, commercial borrowers present a lower risk of default than do ordinary consumers
because of their superior resources. This distinction is compounded when compared to a consumer
with poor credit that qualifies only for sub-prime lending.
281. Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion).
scale approved by the plurality is enough to compensate non-commercial,
secured creditors.282
3. Justice Stevens Fails to Address the Issue of the Proper Risk
Adjustment Scale
Another point of criticism of Justice Stevens's plurality opinion is that
he fails to decide on the proper risk adjustment scale for the formula rate.283
Justice Stevens avoids the question simply stating that "the issue is not
before us."'2 84 Instead, he notes how other courts have approved a 1% to 3%
scale, and, thus, the 1.5% rate proposed by the Tills was appropriate.28 5
While Justice Stevens's referral to the other courts may have implicitly
approved the 1% to 3% scale, one wonders why he failed definitively to
address such an integral part of the very approach he adopts in this case.286
4. The Formula Rate Suffers From the Same Evidentiary Problems as
Many of the Other Cram Down Rate Approaches
While Justice Stevens praises the formula rate as an approach that
"minimizes the need for potentially costly additional evidentiary
proceedings, 2 87 this method may present the same evidentiary problems as
other cram down approaches. Because the bankruptcy court must adjust the
prime rate to account for risk, the parties will still be involved in litigation
over the proper risk adjustment.2 88 Indeed, Justice Stevens states that "[t]he
court must... hold a hearing at which the debtor and any creditors may
present evidence about the appropriate risk adjustment., 28 9  This process,
282. Harris, supra note 147, at 579.
[T]he suggested one percent to three percent cap on a risk-free rate works a grave
injustice to secured creditors .... The potential for undercompensation generated by this
approach greatly undermines the statutory objective of putting the secured creditor in the
same position he would have been had he been able to repossess the collateral at the time
of bankruptcy.
Id.
283. Till, 541 U.S. at 480 (plurality opinion).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Mark G. Douglas, Supreme Court Ruling on Cram-Down Interest Rates Creates Uncertainty
for Secured Creditors, JONES DAY BUS. RESTRUCTURING REV., Oct.-Nov. 2004, at 7,
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/detail.asp?language=English&pubid=1631 ("By declining to specify
how the risk premium is to be computed, the Supreme Court has left the bankruptcy courts in much
the same position as they were before Till purported to answer definitively the cram-down interest
question.").
287. Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion).
288. Ronald F. Greenspan & Cynthia Nelson, "UnTill" We Meet Again: Why the Till Decision
Might Not Be the Last Word on Cramdown Interest Rates, 23-10 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 48, 70 (2005).
"Till virtually mandates that creditors mount 'potentially costly' oppositions to debtors' plans (and
that debtors respond accordingly) or risk being regularly undercompensated for risk. Moreover,
certain ambiguities in the opinion also mean that inquiries as to the appropriate risk adjustment may
be less than 'straightforward."' Id.
289. Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion).
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according to one commentator, "remains fact sensitive" and "will make
adjudication of the issue no less time-consuming to the courts. 290
In short, Justice Stevens's formula approach suffers from the following
weaknesses: (1) it limits judicial discretion; (2) it may undercompensate
secured creditors; (3) its risk adjustment scale is not defined; and (4) it
presents evidentiary problems for the parties and the bankruptcy court.291
C. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas acknowledges that a stream
of deferred payments is worth less than an instant payment, in part because
of the risk of default.292 According to Justice Thomas, this fact is irrelevant,
however, because § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) "requires only that 'the value. .. of
property to be distributed under the plan,' at the time of the effective date of
the plan, be no less than the amount of the secured creditor's claim."2 93 To
illustrate, Justice Thomas notes that the cram down provision never
mentions the value of the promise to distribute property under the plan.294
Because § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) only mentions the value of property-and not
the value of a promise to distribute property-Justice Thomas adopts a risk-
free approach to computing the cram down rate.295
To begin, Justice Thomas reminds the Court of the well-established
principle that "when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the
courts... is to enforce it according to its terms. 296 Justice Thomas then
poses a brief example in order to explain the basic principles of the time
value of money.297 Next, Justice Thomas points out the major flaw in both
the plurality and dissenting opinions: the cram down provision does not
contain a requirement that the interest rate reflect the risk of nonpayment.298
According to Justice Thomas, "it is nonsensical to speak of a debtor's risk of
default being inherent in the value of 'property' unless that property is a
promise or a debt., 299 To illustrate this point, Justice Thomas poses another
290. Harris, supra note 147, at 579; see also Hartman, supra note 140, at 543 ("[T]he risk
premium issue could require significant court time to resolve."); Greenspan & Nelson, supra note
288, at 48 ("[Till] imposes significant new evidentiary burdens on secured creditors.").
291. See discussion supra Part VI.B.1-4.
292. Till, 541 U.S. at 485 (Thomas, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 486 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000) (emphasis added)).
294. Id. at 486 ("[Tlhe statute that Congress enacted does not require a debtor-specific risk
adjustment that would put secured creditors in the same position as if they had made another loan.").
295. Id. at 487.
296. Id. at 486 (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)).
297. Id. at 487 n.l. For a brief explanation of the concepts of present value and the time value of
money see supra Part IV.B.1.
298. Till, 541 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 487-88.
hypothetical showing how property, including cash, "can be and is
determined without any inclusion of any risk that the debtor will fail to
transfer the cash at the appropriate time."300 Justice Thomas does agree with
the dissent, however, that the use of the prime rate in cram down
proceedings will systematically undercompensate creditors, thus raising
policy concerns. 30 1 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas adheres to a strict
statutory interpretation, maintaining that the cram down provision does not
take risk of nonpayment into account.30 2
Next, Justice Thomas notes that in certain circumstances, the risk of
nonpayment can be factored into the cram down rate but only if it is already
included as part of the value of the property itself.30 3 To explain, Justice
Thomas notes how the cram down provision does not limit the term
"property" to only cash.3° Instead, it can include such things as securities,
personal property, real property, or anything of value. 30 5  Thus, Justice
Thomas writes, "if the 'property to be distributed' . . . is a note ... the value
of that note necessarily includes the risk" of nonpayment.30 6 According to
Justice Thomas, however, this risk is built into the value of the note itself
and should not play a part in calculating the appropriate cram down rate.
30 7
Justice Thomas next addresses SCS's argument that the cram down
provision was enacted to protect creditors and not debtors.30 8 First, Justice
Thomas points out that secured creditors are already partially compensated
for the risk of nonpayment by the creditor-friendly holding in Associates
Commercial Corp. v. Rash, which sets the value of a secured claim at the
higher replacement value rather than the lower foreclosure value.30 9 Second,
Justice Thomas notes that despite the many creditor-friendly provisions
found in other subsections of § 1325, Congress chose not to make §
300. Id. at 488. Justice Thomas's hypothetical is as follows:
Suppose, for instance, that it is currently time A, the property to be distributed is a house,
and it will be distributed at time B. Although market conditions might cause the value of
the house to fluctuate between time A and time B, the fluctuating value of the house itself
has nothing to do with the risk that the debtor will not deliver the house at time B. The
value of the house, then, can be and is determined entirely without any reference to any
possibility that a promise to transfer the house would not be honored. So too, then, with
cash: the value of the cash can be and is determined without any inclusion of any risk that
the debtor will fail to transfer the cash at the appropriate time.
Id. Justice Thomas poses this hypothetical to show that, while risk can be factor, it is not required to





305. Id. (citing 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 122, 1129.03[7][b][i], at 1129-44).
306. Id. at 488-89. For example, if a creditor were to loan a sum of money in exchange for a note
and charge interest at 7%, a portion of this percentage could be allocated to compensate for risk. Yet
the note itself will still yield a 7% return on the creditor's funds. In this sense, the value of the
property-i.e., the note-is equal to the principal plus the 7% rate of return.
307. Id. at 489.
308. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 24, Till, 541 U.S. 465 (No. 02-1016)).
309. Till, 541 U.S. at 489 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520
U.S. 953 (1997)); see also supra Part IV.A.
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1325(a)(5) creditor protective by adding a debtor-specific risk adjustment
requirement.31° According to Justice Thomas, if the risk-free rate is
insufficient to fully compensate secured creditors, the issue is a political
question that should be addressed through Congress rather than remedied by
the Court.3'
Turning to the specifics of the case at hand, Justice Thomas notes that
the 9.5% interest rate called for by the Tills' proposed plan was higher than
the risk-free rate.3"' Thus, Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment
because the proposed 9.5% rate would "sufficiently compensate" SCS as
required under § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).3 13
D. Critique of Justice Thomas s Concurring Opinion
The principle defect in Justice Thomas's concurring opinion is that his
position lacks support and goes against the grain of bankruptcy precedent.
While Justice Thomas may view the language of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) as clear
and enforceable on its terms,3 14 other judges and commentators faced with
interpreting the cram down provision have struggled to extract its
meaning."' Indeed, the Supreme Court in the instant case was unable to
come to a majority decision on the issue.3 16 Thus, it is not surprising that
Justice Thomas's interpretation of the provision and resulting risk-free
approach have not been widely accepted. In fact, both the plurality and
dissent in this case, as well as virtually all the lower circuit courts, have
rejected the risk-free approach in favor of some form of risk
compensation. 317 In addition, the risk-free approach may result in an interest
310. Till, 541 U.S. at 489-90 (Thomas, J., concurring).
311. Id. at 490.
312. Id. at491.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 486.
315. See Depperschmidt, supra note 133, at 457 ("The interest rate that debtors pay on claims
outstanding at the time of a bankruptcy reorganization hearing arguably is the most debated
economic issue in bankruptcy litigation."); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in
Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1119 (1985) ("Few bankruptcy issues have met with as much
confusion as the determination of a proper discount rate.").
316. See infra note 421.
317. See In re Kidd, 315 F.3d 671, 676-77 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the coerced loan rate); In re
Till, 301 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (adopting the contract rate); In re
Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1997) (adopting the contract rate); In re Valenti, 105 F.3d
55, 64 (2nd Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S.
953 (1997) (adopting the formula rate); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 71 (3d
Cir. 1993) (adopting the contract rate); United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1131(4th Cir.
1993) (adopting the coerced loan rate capped by the contract rate); In re Fisher, 930 F.2d 1361, 1364
(8th Cir. 1991) (adopting the coerced loan rate); In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1990)
(adopting the formula rate); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir. 1990) (adopting the coerced
loan rate capped by the contract rate); In re S. States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647, 652-53 (11 th
Cir. 1983) (adopting the coerced loan rate).
rate that even the most qualified and creditworthy borrowers cannot
attain."' For these reasons, the risk-free rate has been rejected by the vast
majority of circuit courts31 9 as well as the eight other Supreme Court Justices
in this case.32 °
E. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
One of these justices, Justice Scalia, begins his dissent by noting that his
"areas of agreement with the plurality are substantial., 32' The only area that
he disagrees with is the plurality's use of the formula approach to computing
cram down interest rates.322 According to Justice Scalia, the formula
approach will "systematically undercompensate secured creditors for the
true risks of default., 323  Instead, he adopts the presumptive contract rate
approach.324 This approach minimizes disputes, Justice Scalia writes,
because it is a "good indicator of actual risk. .. and it will provide a quick
and reasonably accurate standard.,
325
1. Justice Scalia Adopts the Presumptive Contract Rate Approach
To support his endorsement of the presumptive contract rate approach,
Justice Scalia posits that the approach makes two important and reasonable
assumptions.326 The first assumption is that "subprime lending markets are
competitive and therefore largely efficient., 327  If this assumption is
accepted as true, then the high interest rates associated with sub-prime loans
are a product of the actual risk of default associated with such loans.328
According to Justice Scalia, if the high rates were associated with exorbitant
318. See Greenspan & Nelson, supra note 288, at 48 n.4 ("[M]any solvent commercial borrowers
who are not in bankruptcy may not qualify for a loan at the prime rate."); see also Harris, supra note
147, at 579; Hartman, supra note 140, at 543.
319. See supra note 317.
320. Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of four Justices, rejects the risk-free rate proposed by
Justice Thomas because it was "too late in the day" to go against the longstanding practice of
accounting for the risk of default when computing the cram down rate. Till, 541 U.S. at 483
(plurality opinion). Justice Scalia, with the support of three other Justices, also rejects the risk-free
rate "[b]ecause there is no guarantee that the promised payments will in fact be made .... " Id. at
505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia agrees with the plurality in three areas. First,
he agrees that some confirmed plans nevertheless fail. Id. Second, Scalia agrees that a secured
creditor is entitled to deferred payments that include an adjustment for the risk of failure of a plan.
Id. Finally, he agrees that while adequate compensation may call for an "eye popping" interest rate,
a court should "refuse to confirm the plan" rather than reduce that rate. Id.
322. Id. at 491.
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profits or costs, "[l]enders with excessive rates would be undercut by their
competitors, and inefficient ones would be priced out of the market. 3 29
The presumptive contract rate's second assumption, according to Justice
Scalia, is that the probability of default does not diminish simply by virtue of
the fact that the debtor has filed for Chapter 13 relief.330 To support this
statement, Justice Scalia notes how failure rates of confirmed Chapter 13
repayment plans range from the Tills' conservative estimate of 37% to a
more realistic rate of 60%.331 Thus, Justice Scalia writes, this relatively high
rate of failure of confirmed plans "proves that bankruptcy judges are not
oracles and that trustees cannot draw blood from a stone. 332 While Justice
Scalia does recognize that judicial and trustee oversight in Chapter 13 will
provide a marginal benefit, the fact that the debtor had to file for bankruptcy
shows his financial instability.3 33 Furthermore, "the costs of foreclosure are
substantially higher in bankruptcy because the automatic stay bars
repossession without judicial permission." 334  For these reasons, Justice
Scalia believes it is reasonable to assume that "bankrupt debtors are riskier
than other subprime debtors-or, at the very least, not systematically less
risky.
335
In summary, Justice Scalia notes that the first assumption means that the
contract rate is a reasonable reflection of actual risk and, according to the
second assumption, this risk continues even when the debtor files for
Chapter 13.336 These assumptions lead to Justice Scalia's conclusion that
"the contract rate is a decent estimate ... for the appropriate interest rate in
cram down. 337
2. Justice Scalia Criticizes the Plurality's Decision
Justice Scalia next addresses the plurality's assertions that the sub-prime
lending markets are not competitive and that risk of default is less in Chapter
13 payment plans than in an ordinary sub-prime loan.33t To rebut the
329. Id. To illustrate, if a lender were to charge an extra 10% interest simply for profit, customers
would take their business elsewhere to a lender who would charge a lower rate with, for example,
only a 2% profit percentage.
330. Id. at 492-93.
331. Id. at 493 n.1 (citing Marjorie L. Girth, The Role of Empirical Data in Developing
Bankruptcy Legislation for Individuals, 65 IND. L.J. 17, 40-42 (1989); Scott F. Norberg, Consumer
Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 415,440-41 (1999)).
332. Id. at 493.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 494 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. Justice Scalia is careful to point out that the contract rate serves only as a presumption
and can be adjusted either up or down according to evidence presented to the court. Id. at 494 n.2.
338. Id.at494-95.
plurality's first assertion, Justice Scalia acknowledges that while the sub-
prime markets are not "perfectly competitive," they are nevertheless
reasonably competitive and reasonably efficient. 339 Justice Scalia also notes
that although cars are generally sold in tie-in transactions, this does not mean
that financing terms are dictated by the seller.34 ° Instead, Justice Scalia
writes, "they only cause prices and interest rates to be considered in tandem
rather than separately., 341 Justice Scalia appears to make one concession,
however, and agrees that the plurality "makes a fair point" when it argues
that in a tie-in transaction there is no way to determine "whether the
allocation of... price between goods and financing would be the same if the
two components were separately negotiated. 342 Yet Justice Scalia argues
that this "is not likely to bias the contract-rate approach in favor of creditors
to any significant degree" and "[w]hile joint pricing may introduce some
inaccuracy, the contract rate is still a far better initial estimate than the prime
rate. 343
Next, Justice Scalia argues that the "mere existence of [state] usury laws
is... weak support" for the plurality's position that regulators believe that
the sub-prime markets are not competitive. 344 He notes that this is only one
of many explanations for the existence of usury laws. 345 Regarding the
Federal Truth in Lending Act, 346 Justice Scalia argues that this legislation
"positively refutes" the plurality's position.347 According to Justice Scalia,
because the Truth in Lending Act requires the disclosure of certain
information necessary to promote the informed use of credit, it presumes
that markets are competitive--otherwise consumers would have no need for
such information.3 48 Finally, Justice Scalia notes that while usury laws do
distort the markets, they help keep interest rates low, thereby giving the
debtor a lower rate under the presumptive contract rate approach.349
Regarding the plurality's second assertion-that the risk of default is
less in Chapter 13 repayment plans than in ordinary sub-prime loans-
339. Id. at 495 n.3.
340. Id. at 495.
341. Id. To support this statement Justice Scalia notes how "car sellers routinely advertise their
interest rates, offer promotions like 'zero-percent financing,' and engage in other behavior that
plainly assumes customers are sensitive to interest rates and not just price." Id.
342. Id. at 495 n.4; Id. at 481 n.20 (plurality opinion).
343. Id. at 495 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is because when a car is sold with a high sale price
and a low interest rate, the creditor will bear the burden of showing that the actual interest rate is
greater than stated on the sales contract. Id. If, on the other hand, a car is offered with a low sales
price and a high interest rate, the buyer can obtain financing at a lower rate from a third party and
benefit from the low sales price. Id.
344. Id. at 496.
345. Id. According to Scalia, one such alternative explanation would be that the laws were
enacted to keep interest rates low for those with financial difficulties. Id. (citing Edward L. Glaeser
& Jos6 Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest
Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1, 26 (1998)).
346. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-49, 1661-65, 1666(a)-(j), 1667(a)-(e), 1671-77 (2000).
347. Till, 541 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
348. Id.
349. Id. at 496 n.5.
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Justice Scalia points out that the plurality assumes that Chapter 13 would be
less risky if fewer risky plans were confirmed, rather than being less risky as
currently administered.350 Justice Scalia adds that the formula rate would
not fully compensate creditors:
While full compensation can be attained either by low-risk plans
and low interest rates, or by high-risk plans and high interest rates,
it cannot be attained by high-risk plans and low interest rates,
which, absent cause to anticipate a change in confirmation practices,
is precisely what the formula approach would yield.35'
Next, Justice Scalia addresses the plurality's argument that transaction
costs and profits should not be included in the cram down rate.352 To rebut
this argument, Justice Scalia notes that the plurality's prime lending rate
itself includes overhead and profits,3 53 because commercial lenders do not
lend money if they cannot cover their costs and make some form of profit. 354
Finally, regarding the plurality's argument that similarly situated
creditors may be treated differently under the presumptive contract rate
approach, Justice Scalia responds by noting that a bankruptcy judge has the
power to exercise his discretion and adjust the contract rate to avoid any
disparity among similar creditors.355 Again, he reminds the Court that the
contract rate should serve as a reasonably accurate presumption that may be
adjusted according to the circumstances of the particular case.356
3. Justice Scalia Criticizes the Formula Rate Approach
In the next section, Justice Scalia opines as to the flaws in the formula
rate approach.357 Also, Justice Scalia analyzes the proper scale for risk
adjustment, something that the plurality specifically refuses to address. 358
To begin, Justice Scalia notes that the risk premium used by the formula rate
approach "is neither objective nor easily ascertainable. 359 While the effect
of this flaw is minimized when the risk premium is relatively small
compared to the prime rate, according to Justice Scalia, a properly computed
risk premium would generally be greater than the prime rate in order to
350. Id. at 496-97.
351. Id. at 497.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. (citing Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., 102 F.3d 874, 876 (7th Cir. 1996)).
355. Id. at 498.
356. Id. at 498 n.7.
357. See id. at 498-504.
358. Id. at 480 (plurality opinion) ("We do not decide the proper scale for the risk adjustment, as
the issue is not before us.").
359. Id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
ensure that secured creditors are fairly compensated.36 Thus, Justice Scalia
writes, "[w]hen the risk premium is the greater part of the overall rate, the
formula approach no longer depends on objective and easily ascertainable
numbers. The prime rate becomes the objective tail wagging a dog of
,,361
unknown size.
Stemming from this lack of objectivity, according to Justice Scalia, is
the fact that the application of the formula rate approach is anything but
simple.362 Instead, the formula approach requires a bankruptcy court to
compute a risk premium in every case. 363  Thus, "judges will invariably
grapple with [the] imponderables" such as "the probability of plan
failure; ... the rate of collateral depreciation; ... the liquidity of the
collateral market, and. . . the administrative expenses of enforcement.
' 364
In contrast, Justice Scalia notes how the contract rate will reflect all of these
risk factors because it is determined by the market. 365  Additionally, the
contract rate can be easily found in the original loan document and need only
be adjusted if the parties choose to contest it. 366
Next, Justice Scalia rebuts the argument that the formula approach
properly places the evidentiary burden on the creditor who has better access
to the requisite information.367 Justice Scalia points out that, "consciously
choosing the less accurate estimate merely because creditors have better
information smacks more of policymaking than of faithful adherence to the
statutory command that the secured creditor receive property worth 'not less
than the allowed amount' of its claim., 368 Also, Justice Scalia predicts that
in most consumer loan cases the cost of litigating the risk premium can
make the issue not worth litigating.3 69 Thus, Justice Scalia opines, "it is far
more important that the initial estimate be accurate than that the burden of
proving inaccuracy fall on the better informed party."37
To illustrate his point, Justice Scalia uses the instant case as an example
of the shortcomings of the formula rate approach. 371  According to Justice
Scalia, there is nothing in the record to substantiate the recommendation of
the 1.5% rate by the Tills' expert witness-especially considering the fact
that the witness admitted that he had only a marginal familiarity with the
sub-prime market and that he had no familiarity with default rates or market
collection costs.372  "In light of these devastating concessions," Justice
360. See id. at 499.
361. Id.
362. Id.




367. See id. at 500.
368. Id. (quoting II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (emphasis added by the Court)).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See id. at 500-02.
372. Id. at 500-01.
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Scalia writes, "it is impossible to view the 1.5% figure as anything other
than a smallish number picked out of a hat. 373
Next, Justice Scalia compares the nominal benefit the creditor would
receive under the formula rate with the expected costs of default.3 74
According to Justice Scalia's calculations, the benefit to SCS in this case
would amount to about $100. 37 5 Justice Scalia then compared this number
with three costs of default, the first of which is the cost associated with
depreciation of the collateral.376 In this case, Justice Scalia calculated the
cost of depreciation to be approximately $550.
3 77
Justice Scalia's second cost of default is liquidation.378 Here, SCS was
entitled to the $4,000 replacement cost.379  However, if the Tills were to
default under their Chapter 13 plan, SCS would not be able to sell the truck
for $4,000 "because collateral markets are not perfectly liquid and there is
thus a spread between what a buyer will pay and what a seller will
demand.5 380 According to Justice Scalia, the value of this spread in this case
could be calculated to be about $450.381
Justice Scalia's third and final cost of default is the administrative
expenses associated with foreclosure.382 To estimate these costs Justice
Scalia notes how the automatic stay provided by § 362 of the Code bars
373. Id. at 501.
374. Id.
375. See id. at 501-02. To come to this number, Justice Scalia explains that if the 1.5% risk
premium were fully paid it would produce about $60.
Given its priority, and in light of the amended plan's reduced debtor contributions, the
$4,000 secured claim would be fully repaid by about the end of the second year of the
plan. The average balance over that period would be about $2,000, i.e., half the initial
balance. The total interest premium would therefore be 1.5% x 2 x $2,000 = $60. In this
and all following calculations, I do not adjust for time value, as timing effects have no
substantial effect on the conclusion.
Id. at 501 n.8. Next, Scalia notes that if the debtor defaulted, the expected value of the $60 would be
only $50. Id. at 501. "Assuming a 37% rate of default that results on average in only half the
interest's being paid, the expected value is $60 x (1-37%[/]2), or about $50." Id. at 501 n.9. To this
$50, Scalia adds another $50 that represents the compensation for risk that is already included in the
prime rate. Id. at 501. Thus, the total expected benefit to SCS was $100. id. at 502.
376. See id. at 501-02.
377. Id. "On the original loan, depreciation ($6,395 - $4,000, or $2,395) exceeded loan repayment
($6,426 - $4,895, or $1,531) by $864, i.e., 14% of the original truck value of $6,395. Applying the
same percentage to the new $4,000 truck value yields approximately $550." Id. at 502 n. 12.
378. Id. at 502.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 503.
381. Id. To come to this number Scalia used the Rash case as a rough guide. Id. at 503 n.13; see
Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 965 (1997). "The truck in Rash had a
replacement value of $41,000 and a foreclosure value of $31,875, i.e., 22% less. If the market in this
case had similar liquidity and the truck were repossessed after losing half its remaining value, the
loss would be 22% of $2,000, or about $450." Till, 504 U.S. at 503 n.13 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Rash, 520 U.S. at 957).
382. Till, 541 U.S. at 503 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
repossession of the collateral.383 To overcome this bar, a creditor must pay a
fee and file a motion to lift the stay.3 84 Also, a creditor will incur attorney
fees for filing such motions, which Justice Scalia calculates to be
approximately $600 or more.385
Thus, the total costs of default in this case would be $1,600.386 Because
not all Chapter 13 plans fail, Justice Scalia applies the Tills' estimated 37%
failure rate of Chapter 13 repayment plans to come to an expected cost of
default of $590.387 To compensate for the disparity between the $590
expected cost and the $100 expected benefit, Justice Scalia notes that the
risk premium would have to be 16% rather than the 1.5% adopted by the
plurality. 388 Thus, in Justice Scalia's opinion, the plurality's rate is entirely
inadequate and "is far below anything approaching fair compensation.',
389
4. Justice Scalia Criticizes of Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
In response to Justice Thomas's opinion that § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) plans
need only include a risk-free rate of interest, Justice Scalia presents four
reasons why a plan must account for the risk of nonpayment. 390 The first is
a contextual argument. While the cram down provision does not specifically
mention the risk of nonpayment, Justice Scalia argues that the context of the
other two options found in § 1325(a)(5) support a reading that includes a risk
adjustment. 39' The creditor acceptance and collateral surrender options "are
both creditor protective, leaving the secured creditor roughly as well off as
he would have been had the debtor not sought bankruptcy protection.
392
Therefore, "it is unlikely the [cram down] option was meant to be
substantially underprotective; that would render it so much more favorable
to debtors that few would ever choose one of the alternatives. 393
Justice Scalia's second criticism of the risk-free approach is that it
produces "anomalous results. 394  According to Justice Scalia, Justice
Thomas admitted that if a note, rather than cash, was to be distributed under
a plan, the note must take into account the risk of default. 395  Thus, the
anomaly is that secured creditors would receive risk compensation in certain
383. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362).
384. Id. at 503. Here, Scalia notes that the fee in this case would be $150. Id. (citation omitted).
385. Id. In Indiana and other states, Scalia points out that attorney fees range anywhere from $350
to $875 per motion. Id. (citation omitted).
386. Id.
387. Id. at 503.
388. Id. at 504.
389. Id.
390. See id. at 505-508.
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cases that have no practical difference from other cases where no such
compensation is allowed.396
The third criticism is that the circuits have all rejected the risk-free
approach.397 According to Justice Scalia, there is no evidence that the lower
courts have adopted the risk-free approach, and Justice Thomas never
identifies such a case.395
Justice Scalia's final criticism of the risk-free approach is that it is not
supported by the Court's decision in Rash.399 Justice Thomas argued that
because the Rash decision set the value of collateral at the higher debtor
replacement cost, the secured creditor has already been compensated.40 °
Yet, as Justice Scalia argues, while Rash did point out that there is a greater
risk involved in retention of collateral rather than surrender, the Court "made
no effort to correlate that increased risk with the difference between
replacement and foreclosure value., 40 ' According to Justice Scalia,
"[n]othing in the opinion suggests that we thought the valuation difference
reflected the degree of increased risk, or that we adopted the replacement-
value standard in order to compensate for increased risk., 40 2 Additionally,
Justice Scalia remarks that setting a specific approach to valuing collateral
would not be the choice action "[i]f Congress wanted to compensate secured
creditors for the risk of plan failure. 40 3
To conclude his opinion, Justice Scalia notes that "[e]very action in the
free market has a reaction somewhere. ' 4°  Justice Scalia argues that the
systematic undercompensation of secured creditors in cram down plans will
result in an increase in interest rates overall and a decrease in the access to
credit.40 5  Thus, because cram down requires full compensation for risk,
Justice Scalia adopts the presumptive contract rate approach because it "has
a realistic prospect of enforcing that directive. 4 6
396. Id. at 505-06 ("There is no conceivable reason why Congress would give secured creditors
risk compensation in one case but not the other.").
397. Id. at 506.
398. Id.; see also supra note 317 and accompanying text.
399. Till, 541 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520
U.S. 953 (1997)).
400. Id.; see also supra note 309 and accompanying text.
401. Till, 541 U.S. at 507 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
402. Id.
403. Id.




F. Critique of Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Although Justice Scalia did not speak for a majority of the Court, his
dissenting opinion was able to draw the support of three other Justices.4 °7
Indeed, if he had been able to garner the support of just one more Justice, his
opinion would be the majority rather than the dissent. Nevertheless, there
are reasons why a majority of the Court did not see things as Justice Scalia
saw them.
One of Justice Scalia's principal reasons for dissenting is that, in his
view, the formula rate approach "will systematically undercompensate
secured creditors. 4°8 While this statement may be true, it is important to
remember that Congress intended Chapter 13 bankruptcy to allow debtors to
get back on their feet. 40 9 In addition to this pro-debtor stance, Chapter 13
was intended to be an alternative to liquidation under Chapter 7.410 In this
sense, Chapter 13 benefits creditors in that many times they will be able to
recover more under a repayment plan than under liquidation.41   Thus, the
concern over undercompensation is minimized when creditors receive more
value than under a liquidation proceeding.
Another concern over Justice Scalia's presumptive contract rate
approach is that it places a significant burden of proof on the shoulders of
the debtor. In his defense, Justice Scalia states that the contract rate will
only become an issue if the parties choose to dispute it. 412 Yet in reality, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where a debtor would not want to contest the
rate which may have contributed to his current financial plight. To do this,
the debtor is forced to take on the task of investigating the creditor rather
than focusing his efforts on drafting a feasible repayment plan.413 Indeed,
Justice Scalia himself notes how the debtor may need to present evidence in
order to show that the creditor is substantially oversecured.414 Thus, the
presumptive contract rate heaps the burden of proving the creditor's
financial condition onto the plate of a consumer who is already faced with
financial pressures and the difficulty associated with filing for bankruptcy.415
407. Justice Scalia was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy. Id. at 491.
408. Id. at 492.
409. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079
("[Consumer] bankruptcy relief should be effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh
start.").
410. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079.
411. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079 ("The benefit to
creditors [under Chapter 13] is self-evident: their losses will be significantly less than if their debtors
opt for straight bankruptcy.").
412. Till, 541 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
413. Id. at 478 (plurality opinion) ("The debtor must obtain information about the creditor's costs
of overhead, financial circumstances, and lending practices to rebut the presumptive contract rate.").
414. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
415. Proponents of the presumptive contract rate, however, argue that the formula rate yields
much too low an estimate. Id. at 500. In contrast, the presumptive contract rate is more reflective of
the actual costs and risk involved in Chapter 13 repayment plans. Id. Therefore, "it is far more
important that the initial estimate be accurate than that the burden of proving inaccuracy fall on the
better informed party." Id.
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Finally, Justice Scalia's endorsement of the presumptive contract rate
may be undermined by the fact that Congress may have already rejected the
approach. In 1983, Congress considered but ultimately rejected a bill that
would have supported the presumptive contract rate.46 Given this action, a
red flag is raised as to whether the approach advocated by Justice Scalia
comports with congressional intent.4 17
VII. THE IMPACT OF TILL V. SCS CREDIT CORP.
In Till, the Court sought to give meaning to the phrase "value, as of the
effective date of the plan. ' ' 411 While the opinions in Till specifically
addressed cram down in Chapter 13, the case is likely to have repercussions
in other areas of the Code that contain similar cram down language. 4 9 This
section will first discuss the value of Till's precedent and subsequent
bankruptcy court decisions and then address the likely impact of Till on the
Code and on financial markets as a whole.
A. Is Till Binding Precedent?
While many anticipated a resolution to the cram down interest rate
issue, 420 the Court in Till did not provide us with a clear-cut majority
answer. 421' Because Till is a plurality opinion with no majority, questions
arise as to its precedential value on lower courts.4 22 In this case, there are
416. Id. at 480 n.19 (plurality opinion) (citing H.R. 1085, 98th Cong. § 19(2)(A) (1983)).
417. See Krawitz, supra note 107, at 904.
418. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000).
419. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2000) (cram down provision under Chapter 11
bankruptcy); 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000) (cram down provision under Chapter 12
bankruptcy); Thomas J. Yerbich, How Do You Count the Votes-or Did Till Tilt the Game?, 23-6
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10 (2004); Till v. SCS Credit Corp.-U.S. Supreme Court Rejects
Application of Contract Rate to Deferred Cram Down Payments, SHEARMAN & STERLING CLIENT
PUBL'N., May 24, 2004, http://www.shearman.com/documents/CM_052404.pdf.
420. Roger S. Cox & Marc W. Taubenfeld, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, 57 SMU L. REV.
611, 614 (2004) (anticipating Till as providing a resolution to the issue of the proper Chapter 13
cram down interest rate method); Hon. Barbara J. Houser et al., Disclosure Statements;
Confirmation and Cramdown of Chapter 11 Plans, SJ082 A.L.I.-A.B.A. PROGRAM MATERIAL 305,
341 (2004) (anticipating Till as providing a resolution to the issue of the proper Chapter II cram
down interest rate method).
421. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality opinion in
which Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined. Till, 541 U.S. at 467. Justice
Thomas concurred only in the judgment of the plurality and wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 485.
Justice Scalia delivered a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
and Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 491.
422. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). "When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds ... ' Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976));
Yerbich, supra note 419, at 10 ("Plurality pronouncements have long been the bane of lower federal
two ways to view the Court's plurality opinion. First, because the formula
rate and the presumptive contract rate each drew the support of four justices,
one option is to view this split as giving bankruptcy courts a choice between
the two methods.42 3 The second option is to view the Till opinion as giving
bankruptcy courts a majority answer on which methods not to use. For
example, since the plurality adopted the formula rate and Justice Thomas
adopted the risk-free rate, it follows that a majority of the court rejected all
other approaches including the presumptive contract approach argued by the
dissent.424 While the precedent of Till may be susceptible to different
interpretations, recent bankruptcy court decisions dealing with cram down
issues lend support to the latter option.425
B. Subsequent Bankruptcy Court Decisions
As of August 2005, there have been twelve post-Till court decisions that
have addressed the Chapter 13 cram down interest rate issue.426 In eleven of
these cases, the bankruptcy courts followed the formula rate approach as
adopted by the plurality in Till.427 Thus, it appears that the immediate trend
among bankruptcy courts is to follow the plurality's formula rate
approach.428 In fact, some have even read Till as definitively ending the
dispute over the proper cram down interest rate.429 Despite this readiness to
adopt the formula rate approach, at least one court has decided to not to
follow the plurality holding of Till.4 30
courts in attempting to apply them."); Walker & Nickell, supra note 187, at 1128 ("The lack of a
majority opinion raises the question of whether Till is binding precedent.").
423. See Walker & Nickell, supra note 187, at 1128 ("Whether or not the courts will be able to
find some narrow grounds of agreement on which to base future decisions remains to be seen.").
424. See Yerbich, supra note 419, at 10.
425. See infra Part VII.B.
426. See In re Cachu, 321 B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Cal., 2005); In re Caple, No. 05-50213, 2005
Bankr. LEXIS 1094 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2005); In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2005); In re Pike, No. 03-16382, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 381 (Bankr. D. Kan., Mar. 10, 2005); In re
Willoughby, 324 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D. Ind., 2005); Nowlin v. Tammac Fin. Corp. (In re Nowlin),
321 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. Pa., 2005); In re Berksteiner, No. 03-13203, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1576
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 2004); In re Bivens, 317 B.R. 755 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 2004); In re Harken,
No. 04-02914, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2062 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Nov. 29, 2004); In re Pokrzywinski,
311 B.R. 846 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004); In re Scrogum, No. 04-72289, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1376
(Bankr. C.D. I11. Sept. 15, 2004); In re Smith, 310 B.R. 631 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004).
427. See In re Cachu, 321 B.R. at 718-19; In re Caple, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1094, at *27; In re
Pike, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 381, at *6; In re Willoughby, 324 B.R. at 70; In re Nowlin, 321 B.R. at
685; In re Berksteiner, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1576, at *3-4; In re Bivens, 317 B.R. at 763; In re
Harken, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2062, at *3; In re Pokrzywinski, 311 B.R. at 849; In re Scrogum, 2004
Bankr. LEXIS 1376, at *3; In re Smith, 310 B.R. at 633.
428. See Craig Rankinand & Christopher Alliotts, The Importance of 'Till', NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6,
2004, at 13 ("[T]he plurality's more traditional formula approach will probably continue to be the
method applied by bankruptcy courts.").
429. See, e.g., In re Bivens, 317 B.R. at 763 ("The Supreme Court ended the dispute among the
circuit courts as to which approach provides equivalent present value of an allowed secured claim as
paid over time when it decided Till v. SCS Credit Corp.").
430. See infra notes 431-36 and accompanying text.
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In Ohio, a bankruptcy court recently decided to eschew Till's formula
rate approach in favor of the coerced loan approach that the Sixth Circuit
had previously adopted.43' In that case, the court was faced with the cram
down provision of § 1325(a)(4), which deals with unsecured creditors in
Chapter 13 proceedings.432 While Till addressed secured creditors under §
1325(a)(5)(B), both provisions contain the identical cram down language of
"value, as of the effective date of the plan., 433 Nevertheless, the court held
that Till was not binding authority because there was no majority opinion.434
In its reasoning, the court stated that "the opinion of five Justices makes the
law of the land, but the opinion of four Justices makes interesting
reading. 435
Despite this single case, however, the majority of bankruptcy courts
have followed the plurality's formula rate approach.436 Yet while there
appears to be some agreement in the context of Chapter 13 consumer debt
adjustment, it remains to be seen whether Till will be applicable in contexts
other than Chapter 13 cases.437
C. How Will Till Affect Bankruptcy Under Chapter 11?
While the specific facts of Till limited the opinions of the Court to the
Chapter 13 context, Till's impact may affect Chapter 11,438 which contains a
similar cram down provision.439 Indeed, Justice Stevens noted that it was
"likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow
essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate
under any of [the cram down] provisions." 440  While this statement may
seem to indicate that Till applies to all cram down provisions, commentators
have raised some questions as to whether or not Till should be applied in the
431. In re Cook, 322 B.R. at 346.
432. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2000); In re Cook, 322 B.R. at 339.
433. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2000) ("[V]alue, as of the effective date of the plan ..
with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000) ("[V]alue, as of the effective date of the plan ... ").
434. See In re Cook, 322 B.R. at 341-45. "The lack of a legal rationale shared by five Justices
leads to the inescapable conclusion that Till does not produce binding precedent." Id. at 341
435. Id. at 344.
436. See supra note 426-27 and accompanying text.
437. See infra Part VII.C.
438. Chapter 11 of the Code deals with commercial reorganization. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§
1101-1174 (2000).
439. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(lI) (2000) (cram down provision under Chapter 11
bankruptcy); see also John J. Rapisardi, Court Adopts Chapter 13 Interest Rate for Secured
Creditors, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 2004, at 3 ("The Till plurality's rejection of the market approach to
determining value may have repercussions in other areas of the Bankruptcy Code, such as
determining the valuation of a company in the context of making distributions to creditors under a
chapter 11 plan of reorganization.").
440. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Chapter 1 1 context. 44' Some of these suspicions seem to stem from an
unassuming footnote in Justice Stevens's plurality opinion.442 In that
footnote, Justice Stevens reminds us that there is no readily apparent market
for cram down loans in the Chapter 13 context. 44 3  Justice Stevens goes
further, however, and notes that "the same is not true in the Chapter 11
context, as numerous lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in
possession. 444  Thus, Justice Stevens recommends that "when picking a
cram down rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an
efficient market would produce."" 5
According to one commentator, Justice Stevens's note "appear[s] to
leave the door open to argument that the formula approach should not apply
because of the existence of a [debtor in possession] lending market that can
act as a benchmark for cram-down interest rates."" 6  The fact that there is
no efficient market for sub-prime auto loans seems to have been a major
reason why Justice Stevens adopted the formula rate approach. 44  In
contrast, there does appear to be an efficient sub-prime loan market in
Chapter 1 1 cases, 44 8 and, therefore, "we are left to wonder if footnote 14
nullifies Till in a chapter 11 context ... , modifies its application or is
merely an irrelevant musing." 449 Also, the fact that this footnote is dicta
adds to the uncertainty. a0 In the words of one commentator, "[w]e are left
once again to wrestle with the dreaded footnote, which in the twinkling of an
eye renders what might have been a consistent.., opinion into an
ambiguous platform in the Chapter 11 context. 45'
In addition to the ambiguities raised by Justice Stevens's footnote,
another question threatens Till's effect on Chapter 11. This issue stems from
441. Daniel J. Carragher, News at 11: What the Supreme Court's Prime Plus Ruling Means for
Chapter 11, 23-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 26 (2004) ("[T]here are many reasons why the Till ruling
should not affect existing precedents under chapter 11."); Douglas, supra note 286 ("[W]e are left to
speculate concerning Till's impact on cram-down interest rates under a chapter 11 plan.");
Greenspan & Nelson, supra note 288, at 48 ("[P]articularly in a chapter 11 context, Till raises a host
of issues and contains numerous internal contradictions that inevitably will only be resolved upon
application and appeal.").
442. See Till, 541 U.S. at 477 n.14 (plurality opinion).
443. Id.
444. Id. (citing, e.g., Balmoral Financial Corporation, http://www.balmoral.com/bdip.htm; Debtor
in Possession Financing: Ist National Assistance Finance Association DIP Division,
http://www.loanmallusa.com/dip.htm).
445. Id.
446. Douglas, supra note 286.
447. Greenspan & Nelson, supra note 288, at 48.
448. See supra note 444 and accompanying text.
449. Greenspan & Nelson, supra note 288, at 48. Yet according to one commentator, Till may
nevertheless have a lingering effect on Chapter II in that creditors will "face an uphill battle in
opposing confirmation of a plan that utilizes the formula rate in a chapter II case." Till v. SCS
Credit Corp.-U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Application of Contract Rate to Deferred Cram Down
Payments, SHEARMAN & STERLING CLIENT PUBL'N., May 24, 2004,
http://www.shearman.com/documents/CM-052404.pdf.
450. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935) (finding that dicta "may be
followed if sufficiently persuasive" but are not controlling).
451. Robert C. Goodrich, Jr. & Madison Cashman, Money in the "Till", 2004 No. 10 NORTON
BANKR. L. ADVISER 1.
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the different policy concerns raised by Chapter 1 1 and Chapter 13.452 In his
endorsement of the formula rate approach, Justice Stevens was aware that
the process of filing for Chapter 13 debt adjustment should be as simple and
straightforward as possible for the debtor.453 In fact, Justice Stevens made a
conscious effort to place the evidentiary burden squarely on the shoulders of
the secured creditor.454 Yet some would argue that the same policy concerns
are not present in the Chapter 11 context, and, thus, the Till ruling should not
apply. 455 As one commentator stated:
The Court was split, we suspect, because this case involved a
consumer debtor. Although Chapter 13's cramdown provision is
theoretically identical in substance to § 129(b)(2)(A), we doubt the
Court would have reached the same conclusion if the secured lender
were the United States with a tax lien or if the debtor were a
business debtor.456
Therefore, because Chapter 13 involves consumers and Chapter 11 involves
commercial entities, the different policy concerns attached to each may limit
Till's reach.457 Nevertheless, Till will likely "provide additional fodder for
business debtors to squeeze secured lenders in contested bankruptcy
confirmations. 458
With the uncertainties raised by Justice Stevens's footnote and the
various policy concerns involved in applying Till to Chapter 11 cram down
cases, it may be helpful to examine how bankruptcy courts have addressed
this issue. As of August 2005, at least two bankruptcy courts have examined
Till's effect on Chapter I l's cram down provision. Interestingly, both
cases refused to hold Till's formula rate approach as binding authority,
finding that "Till is instructive, but it is not controlling, insofar as mandating
452. See Carragher, supra note 441, at 26, 64.
453. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (plurality opinion) (noting how the formula
approach "entails a straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry, and minimizes the need for
potentially costly additional evidentiary proceedings.").
454. Id.
455. Carragher, supra note 441, at 26.
456. Michael L. Cook, Preface to 1 UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF BANKRUPTCY &
REORGANIZATION 2004, at 27, 40 (Lewis Kruger ed., 2004). "Causing the lender to bear [the
evidentiary] burden in a consumer bankruptcy case... is quite different from requiring the lender to
bear it in the business reorganization context." Id.
457. See Carragher, supra note 441, at 26; see also Greenspan & Nelson, supra note 288, at 48
(recognizing that Till may not apply to complex Chapter 11 cases that involve businesses rather than
individuals); Clyde Mitchell, High Court Takes Interest in 'Cramming Down' Banks, N.Y.L.J., July
14, 2004, at 3 ("Till involved a consumer debtor, and thus, the case may be limited to its unique
facts.").
458. Dennis J. Connolly, High Court Cram-Down Decision Will Have Big Impact: The Plurality
Opinion in 'Till' Will Have Economic Effects on Lenders, Creditors, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 2004, at 20.
459. See In re Am. Homepatient, Inc., Nos. 03-6500/03-6501, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17203 (6th
Cir. 2005); In re Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005).
the use of the 'formula' approach described in Till in every Chapter 1 1
case." 460 Although one of these courts did apply the formula approach to the
Chapter 11 case, it stated that Till was merely a fallback and not binding
authority in all Chapter 11 cases.461
D. What Does Till Mean for the Average Consumer Filing for Chapter 13
Relief?
While there may be some uncertainty as to whether Till should apply to
Chapter 11, the plurality's formula rate approach will most likely be used by
bankruptcy courts in the Chapter 13 context.462 This will affect the Chapter
13 debtor in two ways. First, in the words of Justice Stevens, debtors now
have a "straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry., 463  All debtors
need to do is set the cram down rate at prime and then adjust it for risk.4 4
While disputes could arise as to the proper risk adjustment,465 as long as
debtors add 1% to 3% to the prime rate their chances of confirmation are
very good.466 In any case, "Till gives debtors extra leverage by placing the
burden on the secured creditor to demonstrate what the risk premium for a
cram-down loan should be. 467
Second, setting the cram down interest at the low prime-plus-risk rate is
likely to save debtors millions in finance charges every year.468  These
savings, in turn, will make the debtors' repayment plans more manageable
and will provide more money to pay unsecured creditors.469
E. What Does Till Mean for the Sub-Prime Lending Markets?
While Till presents significant advantages to the Chapter 13 debtor, the
case is likely to have a detrimental effect on the sub-prime lending markets
as a whole.47 ° For example, because Till allows debtors to deprive sub-
prime lenders of their initial high contract rates, these lenders will have to
460. In re Am. Homepatient, Inc., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17203, at *19 (citing In re Prussia
Assocs., 322 B.R. at 585).
461. In re Prussia Assocs. 322 B.R. at 590.
462. See Rankinand & Alliotts, supra note 428, at 13; Yerbich, supra note 419, at 10; see also
supra Part VII.B (explaining how all post-Till bankruptcy court decisions dealing with the proper
Chapter 13 cram down rate have applied the formula approach).
463. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (plurality opinion).
464. Id.
465. See Dan Schechter, Supreme Court Approves "Formula Approach" to Cramdown Interest;
Ruling Will Affect Subprime Market and May Affect Commercial Finance, Com. Fin. News, May 24,
2004, at 36.
466. Yerbich, supra note 419, at 59.
467. Douglas, supra note 286.
468. James J. Haller, What Till v. SCS Credit Corp. Means for Your Chapter 13 Clients, 92 Ill.
B.J. 478, 480 (2004) (estimating that as a result of the lower interest rates presented by the formula
rate method Chapter 13 debtors will save over $335 million per year nationwide).
469. Id.
470. See Connolly, supra note 458, at 20; Douglas, supra note 286; Schechter, supra note 465, at
36.
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turn to other methods of making profits.47 This, in turn, may force creditors
to charge higher up-front fees and increase their sub-prime interest rates
across the board.472  Thus, in the words of one commentator, these "other
means of extracting value.., can only mean bad news for the nation's
riskiest borrowers. 473
F. How Will the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 Affect Chapter 13 Filings?
On April 20, 2005, President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. 47 4 Aimed at those who
"walk[] away from debts even when they [have] the ability to repay
them,, 475 the 2005 Act makes it more difficult to file for liquidation under
Chapter 7 and forces more debtors to turn to repayment plans under Chapter
13. 476
This reform is accomplished through a more stringent qualification test
for those seeking Chapter 7 relief.477 Prior to the 2005 Act, if it was
determined that the debtor abused Code provisions, the case would be
dismissed. 478  This abuse included unreasonable delays by the debtor,
nonpayment of fees or charges, and the failure to file certain documents
required by the bankruptcy court. 4 79  The 2005 Act, however, amended
Chapter 7 to include an additional presumption of abuse that can arise if the
debtor fails a two-part test.480  Under this test, the first level of inquiry is
whether the debtor's annual income falls below the median family income of
those who reside in the applicable state.4 81 If the debtor is below the state
471. Douglas, supra note 286; see also Connolly, supra note 458, at 21 ("[I]nvestors will require
more of a cushion to address bankruptcy issues.").
472. Douglas, supra note 286 ("[Till's repercussions] could entail higher front-end fees, even
higher interest rates"); Schechter, supra note 465, at 36 ("[L]enders will have to 'frontload' [cram
down] risk by building it into every borrower's interest rates.").
473. Douglas, supra note 286.
474. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23, § 102 (g) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(7)); Nedra Pickier, Bush Signs Big Rewrite
of Bankruptcy Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWiRES, April 20, 2005, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/WireStory?id=688026.
475. Press Release, The White House, President Bush Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention,
Consumer Protection Act (April 20, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html [hereinafter White House Press
Release].
476. Jeanne Sahadi, President Signs Bankruptcy Bill (April 20, 2005),
http://money.cnn.com/2005/04/20/pf/bankruptcy-.bill/.
477. See id.
478. See II U.S.C. § 707 (2000).
479. See 1 U.S.C. § 707(a).
480. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23, § 102(a)(2)(C) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2)(A), (b)(6)-(7)).
481. See id. § 102(a)(2)(C) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(6)-(7)).
median income, then the presumption of abuse will not arise and that
individual may still qualify for Chapter 7 relief.482 If the debtor is above the
median income, however, then the individual is subjected to a second level
of inquiry to determine whether or not he or she can afford to repay
debtors.483
Under this second level, the debtor must pass a means test which
involves a calculation of monthly income. First, the debtor's monthly
earnings are reduced by necessary living expenses as determined by Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) standards.484 The reduced monthly income is then
multiplied by sixty months.485  To avoid a presumption of abuse, this total
amount must be less than the lesser of (i) $10,000 or (ii) 25% of unsecured
claims, or $6,000, whichever is greater.4 86 If the debtor fails this second test,
then a presumption of abuse arises which prohibits the debtor from filing for
liquidation under Chapter 7.487
Thus, the new legislation-which is set to take affect on October 17,
2005 4 88 -"will help ensure that debtors make a good-faith effort to repay as
much as they can afford., 489  Consequently, the Act will force more
individuals to file for repayment plans under Chapter 13.490 Because of this
anticipated increase in consumer debt adjustment filing, it follows that more
secured creditors will be subjected to the cram down provision of Chapter 13
and the holding of Till.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Till, the Supreme Court sought to bring clarity to the "murky waters"
that are the Bankruptcy Code's cram down provisions.49' Despite these
good intentions, the Court's decision may have brought more confusion to
the issue.4 92 On one hand, Till has provided a guide from which debtors can
model their repayment plans, creditors can strategize, and bankruptcy courts
can follow. 4 93 Indeed, bankruptcy cases subsequent to the Court's decision
482. See id.
483. See id.
484. Id. § 102(a)(2)(C) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)).
485. Id.
486. Id. For example, assume that Debtor's reduced monthly income over sixty months totals
$5,900 and 25% of his unsecured claims equals $5,000. Although the $5,000 is less than $10,000,
Debtor's reduced income will be compared with $6,000 because it is greater than 25% of his
unsecured debts. In this case, Debtor avoids the presumption of abuse because his reduced income is
less than the $6,000 minimum. As a further example, assume that Debtor's reduced monthly income
total now amounts to $9,900 and 25% of his unsecured claims equals $15,000. Because the
unsecured claim percentage is greater than $10,000, the $10,000 number controls. In this instance,
Debtor may also avoid the presumption of abuse because his reduced income is less than $10,000.
487. See id.
488. Epstein, supra note 88, at B7.
489. White House Press Release, supra note 475.
490. Sahadi, supra note 476.
491. See Connolly, supra note 458, at 20.
492. Goodrich, supra note 451, at 1.
493. See Yerbich, supra note 419, at 59.
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have adopted and applied the plurality's formula rate method.494 On the
other hand, the lack of a majority opinion severely limits Till's application
beyond Chapter 13 proceedings. 495 Because of its narrow scope and a
solitary footnote in the plurality opinion, commentators are left to wonder
how or if Till will apply in the Chapter 11 context of commercial
reorganization.496 Certainly, "the decision leaves significant uncertainty in
the area of valuation of deferred payment streams. 497
In short, Till leaves us with three questions: Is Till the last word on the
proper method for computing cram down rates? Will the plurality's formula
rate approach apply to Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases? Will Congress amend
the Code and provide us with its intended meaning of the words "value, as of
the effective date of the plan?" Only time can answer these questions.
Phillip J. Giese49 8
494. See supra Part VII.B.
495. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("[W]hen a fragmented Court decides
a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds.."') (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
496. See discussion supra Part VII.C.
497. Connolly, supra note 458, at 21.
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